Interview with Archer K. Blood

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

ARCHER K. BLOOD

Interviewed by: Henry Precht

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[Note: This transcript has not been edited by Consul General Blood]

Q: I am Henry Precht, a retired Foreign Service officer. I'm interviewing Archer Blood, another retired Foreign Service officer with extensive experience in South Asia. The interview takes place on June 27, 1989, at his home in Meadville, Pennsylvania.

Perhaps, Arch, to start with you could give a brief summary of your career for the benefit of those people who will be using this material.

BLOOD: I entered the Foreign Service in July 29, 1947. My reasons for doing so are still very vague in my own mind. I'd never been abroad except in the Navy in the Aleutians. I'd never known anybody in the Foreign Service. But I had developed in my teens an interest in the Foreign Service, and when I entered college, I put that down as my career preference. Then I began to alternate with law. And I was in law school at the University of Virginia when I passed my orals for the Foreign Service. I had to make a quick decision as to which way I would go, and I opted for the Foreign Service.

It was a good time to enter the Service because it was expanding. There were forty people in our class, and there was a class of almost forty during the summer of 1947.

My first post was Thessaloniki, Greece, at the time of the civil war against the communist-supported insurgents who were trying to topple the Greek government.

Q: Before we get into any of the detail, why don't you just run through the succession of posts that you had.

BLOOD: Okay. First post was Thessaloniki; then Munich, Germany; then back to Greece to Athens; then to Algiers after a mid-career course at the Foreign Service Institute. Then after a very brief stay in Algiers, my position was eliminated, and I was transferred to Bonn. From Bonn, I returned to the State Department for four and a half years, half of which was in the Executive Secretariat, and half of which was as the Cyprus desk officer. I then went out to Dacca.

Q: What year is that?

BLOOD: In 1960. That was my first exposure to South Asia was the assignment to Dacca as political officer and deputy principal officer in the consulate general there. After two years, I was assigned to the Army War College as a student. Then I went to Personnel and headed up the NEA branch in assignments. From there, I went to Afghanistan to Kabul as deputy chief of mission. After three years, I was assigned as political counselor in Athens.

I was there not quite two years and was transferred directly to Dacca again, East Pakistan, as consul general. There I was caught up in the Bangladesh crisis and spent less than two years, returning to Personnel, where I was for about two and a half years and then went to the Army War College as deputy commandant for international affairs. I spent three and a half years there waiting out Dr. Kissinger's departure from the State Department and then went to New Delhi as deputy chief of mission.

While in New Delhi I also, at the Department's request, went up to Kabul again to take over the embassy briefly while the—

Q: In which year was that?

BLOOD: This was 1979, October-November '79, just weeks before the Soviet invasion. And when I left New Delhi in the end of September 1981 and returned to Washington, I agreed to go again to Afghanistan as charg# and was studying Dari at the Foreign Service Institute preparing to go out there in February of 1982, but the communist government of Afghanistan refused to issue me a visa and that assignment fell through. In May of 1982, I retired from the Foreign Service and subsequently ended up at Allegheny College as diplomat in residence and visiting professor of political science.

Q: Good. Now, let's go back to the beginning. When you joined the Foreign Service, I wonder if you give us some of your impressions of the forty people who joined—or the thirty-nine who joined—with you and the group that you immediately came to know. What kind of Service was it? Was it much different from what it is today, or how would you characterize the people who were with you in that group?

BLOOD: Well, first of all, it was an all-male class. All white. Some very, very able people. Hermann Eilts was later ambassador in Saudi Arabia and Egypt was a member of that class. There was a lot of considerable talent in that group, and it was a group in which I was very proud to be associate with from the very beginning. At the same time, there were in that class, several people who struck me as outright jerks who—and I wondered how they had gotten in. I suppose they had done well on the exams, but I couldn't imagine how they had passed the screening of the oral. And in two cases I have in mind, both of those officers were out of the Service within two years for various reasons such as falling in love with the daughters of communist officials or other unacceptable acts.

But it was an exciting time to be entering the Foreign Service, and we knew that the United States was developing responsibilities all over the world. You knew you were in a growth industry.

Q: Was there a great deal of area expertise among the people in your group?

BLOOD: Yes there was. Of course, Hermann Eilts himself had spent many years as a youth in the Middle East. Many of them, like Sid Sober, had excellent French or other language. Lee Andorus also had excellent language capabilities. All of us, of course, had been in the military service and had some experiences outside the United States, although mine was confined to Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, but others had spent time in Europe or the Far East.

Q: Was it true that this was the time when people were recruited from the northeastern establishment or was it broadly geographic in its representation?

BLOOD: Even then it was broadly geographic. I suppose the majority of our class were from the east coast, but they were—I mean, it was a representative grouping except for the fact that there were no minorities or no—

Q: Women.

BLOOD: Females, women, in that class.

Q: And what about the security factor? I mean, this was the time when anti-communism was becoming a very important consideration in government service. Do you recall anybody scrutinizing your records especially closely for leftist leanings?

BLOOD: No, that came later. That came during the McCarthy period when I was serving in Germany at the time and was very much aware of the witch hunts, you might say, for alleged communists in the Foreign Service. But at the time I entered, we went through security checks but certainly were not aware of anything very extensive or demanding.

Q: Then you were off to Thessaloniki. The Greek civil war was on at that time, wasn't it?

BLOOD: That's right.

Q: What were some of your impressions of political conditions in Greece at that time?

BLOOD: Well, Thessaloniki, being the main city in the north, was sort of a focal point of the struggle against the guerrillas. We were at one time shelled by the Andartes, as they were called. The town was under curfew virtually the whole time I was there. It was difficult to go very far out of town on the roads because the roads were mined, and you ran into dangers of having your vehicle damaged. The United States military presence there was very small in Thessaloniki. We had, I think, two or three Army officers, and that was all. We also though had a British—

Q: There were observers? These American Army officers were observers or were they—

BLOOD: Observers and advisors to the Greek Army. We also had a brigade of British troops there, and there was a rather strong British military presence there and also including some British officers advising the Greek police.

Q: Were the British engaged in actual fighting against guerrillas?

BLOOD: No, they were not. Several of the British were killed in the shelling because one of the mortars landed in their area, but they were not engaged in the fighting. Nor were the Americans.

Q: What was the status of US aid to Greece at that time?

BLOOD: Oh, we had a tremendous aid effort called AMAG, American Mission for Aid to Greece, engaged in a whole range of educational, agricultural, financial activities.

Q: Military as well?

BLOOD: And military aid, of course, also, yes. Most of that, of course, was centered in Athens, and we were a bit out of that. And let's see. Also, the George Polk murder case was perhaps the most—

Q: This was the American journalist?

BLOOD: Interesting. The American journalist who arrived in Thessaloniki and had announced—this was in the spring of 1948—and announced that he wanted to establish contact with the leader of the Andartes. He was found murdered subsequently. Later on there was a trial in which several of the recumbents were convicted in absentia of his murder. But the case aroused a great deal of interest in the United States. Wild Bill Donovan was sent over to represent the media and to be sure that the case was investigated. Our consul general, Raleigh Gibson, I think, spent ninety-nine percent of his time on that case. I, myself, was not involved in it at all.

Q: The allegation is that he was in fact murdered by the Greek rightists who wanted him out of the way and wanted to besmirch the reputation of the communists.

BLOOD: That's one of the accusations. The government case is—that is, the Greek government case against the communist—is a bit flawed. Recently a book has come out about that written by Edmond Keeley, who was the brother of Robert Keeley who has been our ambassador in Greece, which I think takes a rather skeptical view of the convictions of the Andartes.

Q: Did you have any contact with Polk at that time?

BLOOD: No, I did not except that I was married in Thessaloniki on May 14, 1948, and the next day was leaving for my honeymoon in Italy when his body was discovered, but I kept going.

Q: What were your principal duties? Were you a visa officer?

BLOOD: I was consular officer so I had—a large part were visas. Also, we had quite a bit of work with seamen, citizenship matters, notarials, regular gamut of consular work. The most interesting perhaps aspect or different aspect to me was the Ministry of the War Fianc#e Act which allowed American servicemen, veterans of World War II, to bring in fianc#es from abroad without reference to the quota. And many Greeks tried to take advantage of this, and we would constantly be dealing with Greek girls who would come in with letters from a young man in the States saying, “I have been working for your uncle in his restaurant, and he showed me your picture, and I have fallen madly in love with you. I want to marry you. Please take this letter to the American consul and get a visa.” So our job was to decide in fact whether this was true love or fraud, and most of the time, we decided it was fraud.

Q: Oh, that's too bad. You probably prevented a lot of real romance.

BLOOD: I doubt it, I doubt it. When you have a nineteen-year-old boy and a forty-five-year-old Greek woman who have never met, it didn't strike me as an ideal basis for marrying.

Q: What about the political work in the consulate at that time? I suppose that we were at a virtual state of war with the rebels, we had no contact them.

BLOOD: Oh, no, we had no contact with the rebels.

Q: How far left did our contacts go in the Greek political spectrum?

BLOOD: Well, it's hard for me to answer that because I was doing just consular work. The consul general, who was the only one doing political work, was fully engaged with the Polk murder case and the subsequent investigation. We really didn't do any significant political reporting from Thessaloniki.

Q: Then after Thessaloniki, you were off to Munich?

BLOOD: I spent sixteen months there and suddenly received orders in the beginning of March to be in Munich by the end of March. This is 1949. In fact, many of my classmates ended up in Munich administering the displaced persons visa program. We were issuing visas to people who had actually already been screened and approved by the displaced persons program. It was a very routine job, much less interesting than normal visa work. And we didn't even work in the consulate general in Munich. Our section, at least, was stationed at an old German signal corps barrack outside of Munich which was a displaced persons camp.

Q: You had a law degree when you entered the Service?

BLOOD: No, I did not. I had left law school shortly after entering.

Q: Well, you could have had a law degree.

BLOOD: Yes.

Q: Now, for the first few years in your Foreign Service work, you are doing very routine consular work. Did you ever think of leaving the Service at that time?

BLOOD: Yes, I did, especially when at my fourth post was Algiers I found my—no, my fifth post which was Bonn, I still found myself doing consular work. It wasn't very challenging, and I felt that I had to get out of it. I had done political work in Athens before going to Algiers and enjoyed it very much. And then to find myself doing consular work in Algiers, and when I got to Bonn, I was assigned first as, really, official greeter of the High Commissioner which I took care of visiting Congressmen, officials, and briefed various groups. And then Herbie LaRue, the executive director, asked me to take over the consular section in addition which I did.

About this time also, the Service was Wristonized. The Foreign Service was expanded when civil servants and staff corps became FSOs. The number of classes in the Foreign

Service increased from six to eight. I had just been promoted to FSO-4, I went back to class five from four.

And about that time, I thought seriously about wondering whether to continue. But then I got a good job in Bonn as civil military relations officer acting as liaison between the Germans and our own military headquarters in Heidelberg. And then from there, went to the Department with good jobs, and from then on, I never had to do any consular work except in a supervisory capacity as the DCM.

Q: Okay, well, let's go back to Munich for a moment. Anything in that tour that you think worthy of recording for history?

BLOOD: Not really. I think the DP program was a well-conceived program, and we were bringing in many, many Jews, many Poles, Hungarians, ethnic Germans from eastern Europe, others who had been displaced by the war and were anxious to get to the United States. So in that respect, one felt you were—these people really were desperate to get out of Germany and get to the United States. But it was a mechanistic, very routine program in which you just issued, you know, hundreds of visas a month.

Q: You didn't even have the challenge of determining whether true love was a factor.

BLOOD: Not at all, no. Or really no challenge in determining whether or not to give the visa.

Q: After Munich, you were back in Athens again?

BLOOD: Yes.

Q: Did you speak Greek by this time?

BLOOD: I had a little Greek, yes. I was assigned to the political section as biographic officer. Actually the interesting reason was—I understand why I got that assignment is

that Claiborne Pell, who is now the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and who was a young Foreign Service officer at the time, had been assigned to that but decided to retire from the Foreign Service so that job came open, and I got it.

Q: Maybe if you had retired at that point, you'd have been the senator. [Laughter]

BLOOD: I would have preferred it. [Laughter]

Q: Well, tell us something about your political work in Athens.

BLOOD: Yes. Well, the job actually developed somewhat differently. I continued to do biographic work, and I enjoyed that thoroughly. In fact, I drafted some very long biographic reports. I was very much taken by the New Yorker profiles and tried to emulate them. I was doing a bit of psychological profiling also in examining Greek political figures. But I was also asked by Ambassador Peurifoy to become the protocol officer of the embassy which I did. That took a great deal of my time. It also meant that I had to look particularly after congressional visits. I also was a liaison with the palace. Any Americans who sought audiences with the king or queen of Greece would have to come to me, and I would intervene on their behalf or discourage them, as the case might be.

Q: What kind of relations did we have with the palace at that time? How would you characterize them?

BLOOD: Very, very close, very good relationship. The United States ambassador, of course, at that time was really sort of a viceroy in Greece. He sat in on the meetings of the war council. The war with the guerrillas had just concluded, but the United States still was providing massive economic aid, and we were very intimately involved in the political developments in Greece.

Charlie Yost was the deputy chief of mission at the time. A splendid, splendid officer. I remember one of my delights of that tour was reading his analysis of that labyrinth and very complicated Greek political situation.

Q: What was the strength of nationalism among the people that we dealt with in the government, the king and his ministers? Were they uncomfortable with the kind of viceroy role that we exercised?

BLOOD: No, I don't think most of them were. I think they accepted it as a benefit to Greece. After all, it was US help which had enabled Greece to defeat the communist threat to the government. Oh, sure, there must have been some who objected to the heavy US role, but it certainly didn't come from the palace nor do I think from the leading political groups.

Q: Intellectuals and journalists were—

BLOOD: Oh, some of them, yes.

Q: Okay. Anything you would like to recall from that period, any incident?

BLOOD: No. It was a very, very busy two years. And also my family increased from one to three in that two years.

Q: Was Cyprus a problem at that stage?

BLOOD: It was just beginning to be. I remember with another officer from the political section going downtown to watch a demonstration by Greeks concerning Cyprus and sort of getting pushed around by the police as a result of our being on the fringes of the crowd. It was just beginning.

Q: Just beginning.

BLOOD: Yes.

Q: All right. Then after Greece, you were off to Algiers.

BLOOD: Well, I first spent four months in Washington at what used to be called the mid-career course. It certainly wasn't the mid point of my career, thank goodness. But it was a four-month course in which we . . . Most of us had been in the Foreign Service for four or five years, and we had a chance to study and discuss various issues. And I think it was interesting. Not a terribly well-conceived course and not very challenging, but I welcomed the chance to see my colleagues again.

Q: The people that you met in that course from service around the world, how did you size them up? Were you still pleased with the quality in the Foreign Service that you saw in them?

BLOOD: That group was not as impressive a group as my initial class was.

Q: Why is that? Was it because of the Wristonization had brought in people from the staff corps?

BLOOD: No, this was still before Wristonization.

Q: I see.

BLOOD: But there were some staff corps people in it. But it was an interesting group. I was still, I would say, impressed by the quality of the Foreign Service.

Q: Then you are off to Algiers after this.

BLOOD: Algiers. Consular officer which I think the interesting explanation that Personnel gave me to for the Algiers assignment: I had applied for Russian language training, and I had also expressed an interest in a French-speaking post on the Mediterranean. The idea

of trying to get my French into better shape. And so I was assigned to Algiers which is, of course, a French-speaking post on the Mediterranean.

And I asked them why Algiers which was then part of the EUR bureau since Algiers was a part of France. And I was, even then, thought of myself as an NEA ham. And they said, “Well, you'd applied for Russian training and Algiers is part of EUR. And if we want to get you for Russian, it's easier to get you if you are serving in a European post.” Which didn't strike me as a very good rationale.

But I was in Algiers only four months because within two months, the new Eisenhower Administration had come in, and they decided that the Foreign Service was over-staffed. And I think it was called Stassenization program, which was a massive cutting back of positions. There were several officers in our—staff officers—they had been formerly in the Foreign Service auxiliary during the war who were actually terminated. My job was terminated, but since I was an FSO, I wasn't fired. I was transferred to Bonn.

But it was a very stupid program because within months, literally, before the end of the year, the officers who had been terminated, who had been sent back at government expense to the United States with their household effects, were invited to reapply for the Foreign Service again because they needed more people. It was a very, very wasteful way of making the political show of cutting back on the size of the Service.

Q: It was not just the Service that felt the effect. It was a government-wide RIF at that time, wasn't it?

BLOOD: Yes. Of course, we were concerned only with the impact then on the Foreign Service.

Q: So then you went to Bonn where you . . .

BLOOD: I went to Bonn as chief of official reception; that was my title. I replaced an officer who was a staff officer who had been hired in Germany. He had been there at the end of the war and kept on. In fact, most of staff then were people who were not Foreign Service officers, and they rather resented those of us who were coming into Germany because we were displacing these people. I quickly found out that that job which had been billed to me as a tremendously important job was a job that took maybe one-fourth of my time. I asked for other work, and they made me briefing officer. I briefed really groups that weren't important enough for more senior officers to brief. And then I also took over the consular section in addition.

But it was a strange post at that time because it was so large, and the FSOs were, at least initially when I got there, a minority. I was the only FSO in the administrative section at the time. Most of the others were in the political or economic section. But this changed over the period I was there.

Q: After a stint in consular work, you went in the political section to do . . .

BLOOD: Well, yes. Herbie LaRue, who was the executive director, promised me that if I took over the consular section that he would see that I got a good job. And he lived up to that. I became the civil military officer working in the political section but primarily responsible for liaison with the US Army headquarters in Heidelberg.

Part of the job then was to work with the Germans and our Army in turning over US Army facilities to the Germans who were then building up their own defense forces. We were turning over assets, that is, barracks, training grounds, all sorts of facilities that used to belong to the German Army and which had been taken over by the US Army. I found that a very . . . The Germans we worked with at that time did not yet have a defense ministry—were very, very able, and it was interesting working with the army. Most of it was done by telephone.

Then when I left, the Army set up a liaison section in Bonn composed of several colonels and lieutenant colonels who handled that function. But when I did it, I did it by myself and was doing it as an FSO.

Q: But your relationship was with the German military not the German foreign ministry at that time?

BLOOD: No, it was not with the German military. It was with German civilians who were running this office called Dienstelle Blanc, named after a gentleman named Blanc. But it was essentially a logistics—it was sort of the G-4 of the incipient German armed forces.

Q: But who staffed it? Were they ex-German military?

BLOOD: Well, I think a lot of them had been in the military. Of course, most Germans had been in the military. But at the time, the leaders that I dealt with were actually civilians, German civilians.

Q: And American military on the other side?

BLOOD: And American military on the other side, yes.

Q: Any reflections from that period?

BLOOD: Well, of course, it was in Bonn when Wristonization occurred, when I was serving in Bonn. And at first, I was very disillusioned, disappointed, when I saw people running the motor pool and others coming in at grades senior to mine. But then over the years as I reflected on it, I realized that this actually turned out to be an advantage to younger Foreign Service officers like myself because the number of jobs in the Foreign Service increased, and we were—it sounds immodest, but it's certainly true—the FSOs were many notches ahead in ability of most of these people who were brought in. In the competition,

we could easily out-distance them so it did create more promotional opportunities for us in the long run. But in the short run, it seemed like a very rough blow.

Q: This was also the period that you mentioned witch-hunting.

BLOOD: Oh, yes. Cohn and Schine, McCarthy's hatchet men, had visited Bonn just before I got there, and the post was still reverberating from that. I remember the questions that the security people would ask. For instance, of course, anybody who had served in China was automatically suspect and a target of investigation. There was a young officer there who was actually the High Commissioner's special assistant. Very able fellow who had served in China as his first post. And I remember being queried by security about him. Questions such as, “Does he read the New York Times?” The New York Times was considered by the security people as a leftist newspaper. And I was young enough to say, “Yes, I hope to hell he does.”

It was fearsome because also there were many allegations of homosexuality. A good friend of mine who I'm sure had—I'm positive had—was completely innocent of the account was accused by some clerk in the embassy. The security approach to this—the SY approach to this—was just so obnoxious. Everybody was assumed guilty until proven innocent that he resigned from the Foreign Service.

But a lot of people who were sensitive were, I think, so taken aback by the techniques employed then that, even though innocent, they left the Service.

Q: What about the young aid to the ambassador?

BLOOD: He unfortunately died of a disease within a couple of years later. But his promotions I believe were held up, and his career was adversely affected solely because he had been in China.

Q: Did the senior officers in the embassy attempt to control this phenomena?

BLOOD: No, they did not. That's the tragic part.

Q: They did not because they were afraid?

BLOOD: They were afraid. That was an eyeopener to many of us to see that people would not stand up. There were a couple of exceptions, but in most cases, people did not stand up very vigorously for personnel who were under accusation even though they knew full well that the accusations were false. Yet, people were reluctant to risk their own careers because if they stood up, they were likely to become targets of an investigation.

I remember, too, we had—again, Herbie LaRue, the exec director, had decided to form an American Legion post there. Many people were put under very great pressure, including myself, to join which I refused to do even though he held up my efficiency report for a good while and kept saying, “Well, you know, have you thought about joining the American Legion?”

I said, “No. I thought about it, but I refuse to do it.” I said, “It's just too big a club. I don't like most of the positions they take, and I'm not going to join.”

He didn't actually punish me in the efficiency report. He made me sweat.

Q: How were your promotions going at this stage? Were you coming along in reasonable progress?

BLOOD: Actually back in Munich I got the first one. That was early. Then it slowed up. And it wasn't until many years later in the State Department when I had a chance to review my file that I found that in Bonn I had been given a overall rating of two minus by an inspection team.

Q: Two minus being?

BLOOD: Two minus being the lowest I've ever heard of. I mean, I think—

Q: On a scale of?

BLOOD: Well, six would have been about the top, but two minus was extremely low. They had asked me questions that said, “Don't you think that this would be a good way of doing this?”

And I said, “No, I didn't think it was.” The only reason that I could think of was I thought they were putting forth silly ideas to see if I would just agree with them. Instead, I decided —perhaps in retrospect maybe they thought they were good ideas; I didn't, and I disagreed with them. But I think that rating probably held me back for a little while, yes.

Q: That was an inspector's rating.

BLOOD: An inspector's rating, yes. Oh, the regular ratings were okay.

Q: That was when officers—

BLOOD: In those days, the inspectors did ratings on everybody, and those ratings were usually lower than the regular ratings.

Q: That changed subsequently.

BLOOD: Oh, yes, yes.

Q: Quite the reverse, wasn't it true later on?

BLOOD: It did, yes. Also, inspectors didn't rate everybody - only those who were on probationary status or up for tenure or in certain categories. But normally they didn't rate everybody. And usually what they did, they were sort of bland and favorable. But in the old days, the inspectors' ratings could be quite rough.

Q: Then after you left Bonn, you came back to Washington?

BLOOD: I came back to Washington and was assigned to the executive secretariat.

Q: Secretary being John Foster Dulles.

BLOOD: John Foster Dulles was the Secretary. Christian Herter was the Under Secretary at that time. And our job in the secretariat, of course, was to basically handle the paperwork coming up to the Secretary and the Under Secretary and then down from them.

I started off as what was called the global briefing officer giving briefings to various groups that came to the Department. I remember I had a map, and I would take them around the world. And it was forbidden to say anything about China. I could talk about Taiwan and the Republic of China and our close relations with them but not to say a single word about the Chinese mainland.

Then, subsequently, I became the editor of the top secret staff summary which is a two or three-page summary of the most important cables prepared every work morning and is on the desk of the Secretary and the President at eight o'clock in the morning. This meant I had to get up at two in the morning, get down the Department at three. I had two other officers working for me. We all three would read cables, and I would pick the cables that would be summarized, and they would summarize them, and we would make up the summary.

Unfortunately, I got caught up in this. This was 1956 when the Hungarian crisis and the Suez crisis were running concurrently. So I was stuck on that job for four months straight, which is a little long because it is a very demanding job. I would then work until about two in the afternoon doing my regular work, go home, try to get some sleep in the summer which was very hard, and then get up again for dinner. Then I would go back to bed, get

four hours sleep before going down at two o'clock in the morning. Many times I was not aware when I woke up whether I was getting up to go to work or not.

Q: Did you have any contact with Mr. Dulles or the other principals in the Department?

BLOOD: Yes, I did.

Q: What were your impressions?

BLOOD: Well, also I should say before that, that the contact mostly came because then I moved into the line which is what we called the line; that is, the officers who took care of seeing the paperwork coming up. We divided it by bureaus. I had EUR and the Public Affairs Bureau primarily and a few others that didn't amount to very much in terms of paperwork like the Historical Division. When Secretary Dulles wanted something, we would send down the request, we were responsible for getting it back on time, be sure that it was correct, clear, and all. And, also, the officers on the line at that time served as the Departmental duty officers. We didn't have a operations center then.

Q: So if there were a crisis in Europe, you had to . . .

BLOOD: Well, no, those of us on the line were the duty officers, the only duty officers for the Department. This was very demanding particularly on weekends. Secretary Dulles liked his privacy. Even assistant secretaries who wanted to contact him had to call us. So I would get phone calls at home or on Saturday morning from people saying they had to see the Secretary. It was difficult as a young officer to make the decision when you were going to call John Foster Dulles and say, “Somebody wants to see you,” or not. Or you just say, “I'm sorry I can't give out his number,” and try to refer them to somebody else.

Also, in those days, if you had an eyes-only cable for the Secretary that came in over the weekend, you went down to the Department and got it. And in your own car, you drove

over to the Secretary's house and delivered it to him and waited there while he read it and gave you instructions as to what to do.

Q: What were your impressions of Mr. Dulles at this time?

BLOOD: First of all, it troubled me that he knew more about the details of the business of the State Department than did most of the senior Foreign Service officers with whom he was dealing. As the EUR man, I would routinely be invited to the briefing sessions with the Secretary that preceded the visit say of the French prime minister or the German chancellor, whoever. And I was struck that in these meetings when questions came up about details, say, “What does the treaty of Rome say?” or this or that, that almost without exception, the Secretary knew the answer.

The senior Foreign Service people said, “I don't know. I'll look it up.” He, who is really more on top of the situation—there were exceptions like—oh, what's his name? [Livingston Merchant?] He was director of European regional affairs at the time. He could match the Secretary in his command of facts. But most of the others couldn't. That disturbed me. I mean, certainly the Secretary was very able, very hard working. But it seemed to me that professionals in the Department ought to be able to, in their own field—because the Secretary was concerned with areas throughout the world not just Europe.

Q: Was he a charitable man when he confronted such inadequacies?

BLOOD: Not too charitable. Also, the other impression I had he was quite inarticulate but in the sense that he answered many questions with grunts. There were people who had worked with him, you know, more closely than I who could interpret these grunts, but I found it very difficult when he would look at me and grunt. And I would normally have to whisper to somebody, “What does he want?”

And they would say, “He wants two copies of this,” or something like that.

And I would go out and get it. But he was not given at all to any small talk or social niceties. All business.

Q: What about his sister? Was she in working in the Department at that time?

BLOOD: Eleanor?

Q: Yes.

BLOOD: Yes, she was. She was, in fact, the director of German affairs then. She was a rather formidable lady. The advice I was given was stay away from her, which I did.

Q: Do you think she was held back by the fact that she was a woman?

BLOOD: No, no, I don't. Well, of course, would she have been where she was if she was not the Secretary's sister?

Q: Right.

BLOOD: Yes.

Q: What about Mr. Herter and others?

BLOOD: Oh, Mr. Herter was the complete opposite from John Foster Dulles. When I went to Mr. Dulles' home to deliver things, he would just look at me and grunt and take it. When I went to Mr. Herter when he was acting Secretary or Under Secretary, he was a soul of courtesy. “Please come in. Won't you have a cup of coffee.” A gracious gentleman who was in all situations a gentleman. Really a fine person to I think all of us who served there. And actually Herbert Hoover Junior was the Under Secretary at first. Both of them were extremely gracious and very well thought of, I mean, warmly by the staff.

Q: But perhaps not as well informed as the Secretary?

BLOOD: Oh, not as well informed, no.

Q: What was the attitude of Mr. Dulles and his associates towards the professional Foreign Service? You say they weren't charitable, but did they look on the Service as someone who got in the way, potentially disloyal? How did they . . .

BLOOD: Well, the Foreign Service always fares better when you have a strong Secretary of State. Well, not always in the case of Kissinger. But normally they would because the Secretary of State is important. John Foster Dulles was, without a doubt, the principal foreign policy advisor to President Eisenhower. I think he used the Department and the Foreign Service well. I think the morale was, I recall it, quite high. We felt we were in an important department, working for somebody who was very, very influential and that the work was recognized.

Q: And the McCarthy period was ended by now?

BLOOD: Yes, by then, that had ended. I think nobody was happy with the way that Dulles or even President Eisenhower had handled that situation, but that had disappeared. The Department was a very, very vital force.

Q: So you spent how many years working in the secretariat?

BLOOD: I spent two years in the secretariat. Then I went to NEA. Probably my favorite job of all in the Foreign Service. I became the first Cyprus desk officer.

Q: This is 19—

BLOOD: This would have been 1958. Cyprus, of course, didn't achieve independence until 1960. It was still a British colony. There was an insurrection going on in Cyprus of the EOKA, the Greek Cypriots trying to achieve union of Cyprus and Greece. Many

negotiations with Greece, with Turkey, and the British. It was coming up in the U.N. brought by the Greeks every year.

The great part about it—I was a class four officer then—was that I was the only person I think in Washington who was solely concerned with Cyprus. There were, of course, many people above me who were partially concerned with it. But all the policy papers and virtually everything, I drafted. It could be changed, as they often were, but it was a feeling of responsibility, sort of a focused responsibility. It was such a challenging job. I was dealing with the British, Greek, Turkish embassies. It was a great job.

GTI—that was the office of Greek-Turkish-Iranian Affairs in NEA which has now been subsequently transferred to European Affairs. And that was a great office. Tremendous people in it.

Q: Who was in charge?

BLOOD: Owen T. Jones was the director, and Mennen Williams was deputy director. Bruce Laingen and I shared an office. I was the Cyprus officer; he was the Greek desk officer. Then, of course, when he was away or on vacation, I also handled Greece. And when I was away, he handled Cyprus. And then Roy Atherton subsequently became, when I left the job, the Cyprus desk officer.

Q: Was the Secretary seized of the Cyprus problem at that time period?

BLOOD: No, he was not. The people we did work with primarily were Bill Rountree—

Q: Who was the assistant Secretary?

BLOOD: Assistant secretary for NEA. Bill Dale who was then director of British affairs in EUR. Bob Murphy who was—

Q: The Under Secretary.

BLOOD: The Under Secretary for Political Affairs. And he was the one that the Greeks and the Turks would come to, particularly the Greek ambassador would see him. The Secretary and the Under Secretary rarely got involved in Cyprus. I think, as I recall, Bob Murphy was really the senior most person with whom I dealt on Cyprus.

Q: Now, what was the US trying to accomplish at that time?

BLOOD: Well, we were trying to, of course, bring about a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem that would secure our military concerns in the area and not upset Turkey too much. We were trying to block, the time I was there, the Greek efforts to use United Nations General Assembly to sort of try to force some action with respect to Cyprus.

Q: We favored an independent Cyprus eventually.

BLOOD: Eventually we did, but we didn't start off that way. I remember drawing up a plan myself that called for enosis of Cyprus with Greece with Turkish bases on the island.

Q: But was that—

BLOOD: That didn't get very far either. I've always thought that the Greeks misplayed the Cyprus—Makarios particularly, the Greek Cypriot leader misplayed the Cyprus issue. If they had—and this is my own theory—if they had accepted the early British offers for limited self-government and had not—

Q: Under British sovereignty.

BLOOD: Well, yes, initially under British sovereignty, but the British were doing this throughout the world, and everywhere it was leading to independence. At this time, the guerrilla, the Eoka guerrilla movement, had not begun. The Turk Cypriots were sort of quiescent and relaxed. And I think if they had done that, accepted the British offers,

that eventually and gradually just like in many places of the world, and without Turkish resistance, Cyprus would have become part of Greece. But the resistance sort of—

[End Tape 1, Side 1. Begin Tape 1, Side 2]

Q: We were talking about Cyprus. Would you continue where I interrupted you?

BLOOD: All right. The Greek Cypriot resistance worried and antagonized the Turkish Cypriots and then the Turkish government. When the Turkish government became intimately involved, the problem became much more intractable. The chance for enosis; that is, union of Cyprus with Greece, which I always had favored myself, disappeared.

The key event, in my own analysis, in the move toward independence was the defeat of the Greek effort at the United Nations in November of 1959. The Greeks had made the mistake of allowing Krishna Menon of India to stage manage their effort.

Q: What was our position?

BLOOD: Our position was against the Greek initiative. We were getting many telegrams from Greek-Americans throughout the country urging us to support Greece in the United Nations. The queen of Greece, Queen Frederika, had a very long-standing letter writing relationship with George Marshall, who was, of course, retired by then. But she was pressing him to intervene on behalf of Greece. And the Queen and the palace, particularly the Queen, was also approaching White House and other people trying to get the United States to change position.

Q: The Greek position being move to enosis and union with Cyprus. Am I incorrect on that?

BLOOD: Well, that was the Greeks' ultimate goal, yes. I forget exactly the technical nature of their proposal in the General Assembly. It wasn't that bold, but it was leading in that direction.

I also recall it was Bob Murphy who held the line in a rather key decision not to go along with the Greeks even though Henry Cabot Lodge, who was our ambassador to the U.N., was urging that we accept the Greek position. Our feeling was that if the Greeks realized that they couldn't get anywhere in the U.N., then they would be forced into negotiations with the Turks and the British. And we wanted to stop, once and for all, the U.N. effort which had been conducted on a yearly basis. We wanted to make it clear to the Greeks that they better give up this U.N. route and resign themselves to negotiations. After the failure of their—

Q: Was this a position that the British wanted and we accepted the British argument, or was it something that we independently arrived at?

BLOOD: I think we independently arrived at it. We had, at that time—our primary contacts were with the Greeks. They were in constantly berating us. The Turks came to see us much less frequently. And the contacts with the British were not as frequent as with the Greeks and the Turks.

Q: But you don't think at a senior level, there were consultations with the British?

BLOOD: Oh, there were. Of course, we had an excellent consul general in Nicosia. At that time, of course, it was a consulate general, Toby Belcher, who was superb and had a wonderful relationship with Sir N. Harding who later became Lord Carradon. But in Washington, no, I don't think so. And I know that if there had been, I would have known about it because whenever the Secretary and Under Secretary were not involved in Cyprus, Mr. Murphy was. When anybody ever came in to talk Cyprus to him, I was there as the note taker.

Q: What about the Turkish position? They were just too preoccupied with their own internal affairs, or why didn't they take a more active role? Why did the Turks leave the problem alone at this stage?

BLOOD: Well, the Turks were playing to their strength. They had won our gratitude in Korea. They were, in terms of military significance to NATO, more important than Greece, and they knew it. And they, I think, sensed that we were probably not going to accede to Greek wishes. They weren't importuning to us to do anything. They were really concerned that we not adopt the Greek point of view; and they knew we weren't, so they were rather relaxed.

Q: You indicated earlier that they might have been prepared to accept union with Greece.

BLOOD: Before the troubles began, yes. And if the Greek Cypriots had not come into active hostility with the British. If the offers of limited self-government had been accepted, it could have played out gradually over a period of years without strife or violence. Yes, I think they would have accepted that.

Q: How significant was Greek pressure, Greek-American pressure, on the State Department at this time?

BLOOD: Not very significant, really. They were always behind the curve in the sense that the cables which we would receive asking us to vote for the Greek resolutions in the General Assembly would usually arrive at the State Department after the vote had been taken. And we were, therefore, able to send off a standard reply, “Well, thank you, but, you know, this is already after the fact.”

Q: What about through the Congress? There was no organized effort—

BLOOD: At that time, the Greek lobby was not as sufficient as it later came to be. There were a few congressmen—I remember John Brademas of Indiana, who is now president

of NYU—who was interested. But even then, he was very sympathetic to all the other considerations and not blindly in support of Greece. In fact, we discounted the Greek-American pressure and could afford to do so.

Q: Greek money wasn't important politically? There were no wealthy Greeks who had a—

BLOOD: Oh, you had people like Tom Pappas who was a wealthy Greek-American from Boston close to President Eisenhower, but their lobbying efforts weren't really well focused.

Q: So how long did you have this job?

BLOOD: I had it for two and a half years, and then I left to go out to Dacca in the summer of '62.

Q: That was a big change jumping from the Mediterranean to Pakistan.

BLOOD: Yes, but remember that NEA Bureau ran from Greece to Dacca. So I was still within my bureau, I was just in a different area of it.

Q: But did you seek that assignment? Was that your choice to go to Dacca?

BLOOD: No. Well, they offered me a comparable job in Madras or Dacca. I thought that Dacca seemed more interesting because the consulate general there was separated from the embassy by over a thousand miles, and it would be more of an independent post.

Q: And what was your job in Dacca?

BLOOD: In Dacca, I was political officer and also deputy principal officer. That second aspect became more important.

My consul general there was Nat B. King, who really didn't like the management functions of the job particularly. And particularly when he wrote efficiency reports, he said, “I've only

known this officer for a year, and I'm really not in the position to make any judgment." I told him that he was crucifying officers by statements like this even though he didn't intend to do so.

So I volunteered to write all the efficiency reports for his review just to protect the officers. And I did so. He allowed me to do more and more of this so I became sort of a baby DCM in the consulate general which to me made the job more interesting than doing the straight political work.

Q: What was the political work like at that time?

BLOOD: Well, in large part, it was reporting the grievances of the Bengalis against the government of Pakistan and against West Pakistanis. This annoyed Washington because Washington liked to believe that Pakistan was a stable, united country. Ayub was then president of Pakistan. Popular in the United States, but not popular in East Pakistan. We were aware, as I was aware later on at my second tour in Dacca of course, that we were preaching a message that wasn't very popular. But everybody who served in Dacca has been so struck by the obvious fact of this unhappiness that we all reported.

Q: Now, in East Pakistan the government of the region was appointed by the West Pakistan authorities?

BLOOD: The governor was appointed. That was Ahsum Kandu, who actually was very popular.

Q: He was a Bengali?

BLOOD: No, he was not Bengali, he was a general. But he had a falling out with Ayub and was replaced. He was the key official. The next most important official would be the general office commanding; that is, commanding the Pakistan military. And we actually became very close friends with him.

At that time, we had very good cordial relations with the Pakistani military and with the West Pakistani authorities as well as with the Bengalis.

Q: And no one hesitated to talk to you, I suppose?

BLOOD: Nobody hesitated to talk. The Pakistanis were more circumspect than say Greeks would be about talking politics. But you had open access.

The problem there was we had a large AID mission. The AID mission director in Karachi, which was still then the embassy, had much more access to the leadership of Pakistan than did our ambassador. In East Pakistan, the director of the AID mission had more access to the governor than did the consul general. There was considerable friction between the two. AID was, in those days, a big dominant organization which threw its weight around a lot. That was one of the sort of irritating aspects of that job.

Q: Now, you say Washington wasn't happy with your reporting on grievances.

BLOOD: Well, they never objected openly, but . . . For instance, we had been reporting that Ayub was unpopular, that Ahsum, the governor, however, was popular and perhaps his popularity might lead to his removal because the president might consider him a rival. And in the summer of 1961, a young American came over to East Pakistan on a Farm Bureau exchange, and he worked in a Bengali farm for a while. When he came back to Washington, he was debriefed, and he said, “Ayub was wildly popular in East Pakistan, but they don't like Ahsum.”

The desk sent me a cable saying, “Well, we've got this information. What do you think of that?”

And I was so teed off by it that I refused to answer it because, I mean, here is this one young man in the country in the wake of years of steady reporting to the country. But it just

struck me that they were grasping at straws. Finally, somebody had told them what they wanted to hear, and they were trying to latch on to it.

Q: When you had contact with these unhappy Bengalis, did the West Pakistani authorities either in Dacca or back at Karachi complain about your activities in talking to their opposition?

BLOOD: As I recall, they did occasionally. I think we all were aware we had to be rather circumspect in our dealings. I was put in sometimes a difficult position by Mr. Suhrawardy, who had been prime minister of Pakistan and who been the leader of the Awami League but was sort of in retirement and no longer an important political figure. He would call me at home and say, “Let's go to the movies or let's do this or that.”

And I would try to have to fend him off because I realized that if I were seen in public with him, it would be embarrassing. I mean, the Pakistan government wouldn't like it, and it could be embarrassing to the US. And besides, at that time he was really not that significant enough a figure to warrant the risk.

Q: What were the consulate general's relationship with the embassy a thousand miles away?

BLOOD: Miserable.

Q: Well, that's true of every consul general with every embassy, isn't it?

BLOOD: Yes, but these were even worse.

Well, I really probably shouldn't say this but Nat King would—his wife had never come out to Dacca. Oh, he kept saying she would join him; she was living in Switzerland. He was, I think, lonely. And he took to drinking. And he would call me on Sunday afternoon and show me a cable he was sending to the embassy chewing them out for this or that.

Q: What kind of this or that? Failure to provide administrative support?

BLOOD: Support, often that. Sometimes policy guidance but mostly on administrative and housing matters and things like that. I knew that it wouldn't do any good, and it would just get him into trouble. So my job was, I felt, to talk him out of sending this cable which I would nearly always succeed in doing, but it took about an hour and a half of a Sunday afternoon getting him out of this mood. He was very, very irritated with the embassy, and they knew it. I was sort of a buffer in a way. But I liked Nat, and he was good to me. I was really trying to protect him from actions I knew would just get the embassy angrier and angrier.

Q: What about the AID mission? You say they had more access. Did they respond to directions, suggestions on how to conduct themselves?

BLOOD: Not very well. The AID mission director was not a very impressive fellow. A fellow who had been, I think, a sergeant in the Army, in the military, and had come up through sort of their administrative ranks. He was not an economist. He was very concerned with his own position.

I mean, AID for instance lived so much better than the rest of us lived. They all had air-conditioners in every room of their house and air-conditioned automobiles. We didn't. It was sort of a two-class society in East Pakistan. The Foreign Service and the USIA and CIA were sort of the lower class, and AID was the upper class.

Q: How would you evaluate the work that they were doing there? Were they making a real contribution to—

BLOOD: I think they were doing good work, yes. I think they were.

Q: And they were well received by the Bengalis?

BLOOD: Oh, they were well received, yes, because they were distributing large amounts of assistance.

Q: What about the CIA? How did they fit into that picture? Did they cause you a problem or their operations?

BLOOD: No. They were small. There were only two officers there and a secretary. We worked very closely with them. Never any friction there.

Q: Was there an insurgency problem at that time? Was there any revolt under way against the Pakistani authorities?

BLOOD: No, no.

Q: And there was no difficulty with the Indians? The Indians were not stirring up trouble in any fashion at that stage?

BLOOD: No, there could be communal disturbances, you know. If one occurred in India say with the Hindus taking out after the Muslims, it would almost automatically within a few days be some incident in East Pakistan with Muslims going after the minority Hindus or vice versa. That was the only—of course, the Indians were very suspect by the Pak authorities, but we tried to maintain contact with the Indian high commissioner, close contact.

Q: This is, what, a dozen years or so more during independence?

BLOOD: Yes.

Q: No one looking back saying, "We made a mistake," or that the union of these two very different parts of the subcontinent was a mistake. No one regretting at that period?

BLOOD: No, no, not really. I think the Bengalis, of course, felt that they were not getting a fair shake. They thought they were being treated as a colony. They were contributing the bulk of the foreign exchange earned by Pakistan, but they were getting, what, maybe a third of the foreign exchange to spend. They were getting, well, less than half of the development funds. Key positions in the civil service and in the military were held by West Pakistanis. They thought that they were just being milked by Pakistan.

Q: But no one was looking back to the past with nostalgia when—

BLOOD: No.

Q: Or to the future of independence with—

BLOOD: At that time, no. They really weren't talking about independence. They were just voicing their grievances, primarily economic grievances. And they were justified, I think, when you consider that over half the population of Pakistan was in East Pakistan, but the West Pakistan was much more prosperous. The businesses in East Pakistan were controlled primarily by West Pakistanis.

Q: An exploited colony.

BLOOD: Yes. That's the way they felt, yes.

Q: Before we leave Dacca, any reflections from that period you want to add?

BLOOD: It was my first introduction to South Asia, and we were able to travel quite a bit in East Pakistan. We got up also to Kashmir and Nepal from there to Calcutta. In those days, we could go frequently to Calcutta. Calcutta was the big city, and you could fly over there in half an hour. I think it was that experience that sort of really piqued my interest in South Asia and made me keen on returning when I had an opportunity to do so.

Q: But you saw it as an area that where there was hope. You weren't too depressed by the —

BLOOD: No, I thought there was hope. I thought there was hope. At that time, 1960 to '62, we estimated the population at 42 million. It is now about 110 million. It seemed possibly manageable. There were lots of AID projects under way. The atmosphere, despite the grumblings of the Bengalis, was one of progress and hope, yes. I didn't come away, you know, discouraged about East Pakistan. I came away troubled about the relationship with West Pakistan.

Q: And still positive about the relationship with the State Department in Washington?

BLOOD: Oh, yes. Oh, yes. We had really no problems with the Department. In fact, I had no problems with the embassy at all. Just the consul general did, but I didn't. They never objected to anything we said.

Q: Then you were back to Washington again, or was that . . .

BLOOD: I went to the Army War College.

Q: I see.

BLOOD: For a year as a student. Enjoyed that very much. There was one other Foreign Service officer, Bob Moore, who spent most of his time in East Asia.

Then at the end of that assignment, actually I was . . . There were two assignments offered. One was—I'm glad I didn't pick now—political counselor in Kabul. And the other was to be head of the NEA branch in Personnel. And I took that job and glad I did. That was another—Cyprus was probably the best job, and maybe that NEA branch in Personnel was probably maybe the next best job.

We had an excellent staff. Earl Sloan was the head of the office. Bob Donhauser was deputy head. I had EUR—I mean, NEA. Charlie Whitehouse had Africa. Cleo Noel had East Asia. Bob Brown, who became inspector general later, had EUR. Pierre Graham, ambassador to Guinea I think later on, had Latin America. It was a great office.

Of course, then, as later, the assignments were made in panel. And those were really fun sessions. It was a negotiating job. I mean, we are negotiating with the bureaus, with the officers, other bureaus all the time. It was a very live wire office, I think, with the—

Q: Yes, you assigned me to Alexandria, as a matter of fact. So you—

BLOOD: And, of course, it paid off in the sense that I was really working not only for Personnel, but I was working for the executive director in NEA, Joe Eggert. And he was the one who said, “Boy, the job you ought to look for at the end of two years here is the DCM job in Kabul.” And he was on my side. I zeroed in on that, and luckily I was promoted to class two that winter in time to qualify for the job.

Q: This was in 19—

BLOOD: This would have been 1965.

Q: '65. So you went on to Kabul that summer?

BLOOD: That summer, yes. Things were going very well. And that was a great—John Steeves was the ambassador. He was the one that picked me. Kabul was a tremendous post. It was probably the best time to be there because it was more open. The country was more open to foreigners than it had been before. We could travel a great deal.

Q: Were the roads paved at that time?

BLOOD: Well, actually, the circumferential, you might say, highway net in Afghanistan is better than in Iran or in Pakistan or India.

Q: But it existed at that time?

BLOOD: Oh, yes, yes. Well, we were building—most of it existed. Part of it was the road we were—while I was there, we finished the road from Kabul to Kandahar, but large parts of it were done.

Of course, we had an attach# plane, and we could use that for travel. The Afghan government was sensitive to that plane going to northern Afghanistan toward the Soviet border, and they would only allow it to go if the ambassador or myself were on board which meant that the air attach# for his own business was constantly asking us, “Can't you think of some reason to go up to Mazar-e Sharif or Qonduz?” And we often did. Sometimes we would take our British colleagues or German colleagues along with us on the flight. It was a great way to travel.

Q: But the Afghan government was sensitive because they didn't want to provoke the Soviets?

BLOOD: That's right, yes.

Q: Was it easy to talk to Afghans at that time? Could you talk to university people and other non-governmental people?

BLOOD: It was. I mean, I think that Afghan officials still, in particular the military—I mean, the military would go to the attach#'s house, but they wouldn't come to our house. I think the Afghan officials were a little nervous about showing up and say going to foreign embassies or foreign residences. But we had a lot of contact with Afghans.

Of course, again we had a very large AID mission with a network of relationships throughout the education world, the government.

Q: Did they speak frankly to you about their political views, these Afghans that you met?

BLOOD: Yes, but at that time the king was starting his sort of a halfhearted democratization program, parliamentary election. I don't think the issues weren't that burning. I mean, it struck us at the time as a calm period. I mean, now of course, the communist party was established then. But in those first couple of years, it was pretty small potatoes.

Our relations with the Soviets were remarkable in that—I've never been in a post where you had as friendly relations with Soviets as we had in Kabul in those days. The Afghans, of course, encouraged that.

We had what we called Soviet-American bashes. About once a month, several American officers would get together with several Russian officers for dinner, a lot of drinking, and bantering back and forth. We would deliberately introduce our junior officers to this one at a time so they could get an idea how clever these guys were and how able they were. Of course, most of the Soviets we were dealing with were KBG types, but they had good sense of humor, very sharp, very sharp. And that was part of our purpose. To let our junior officers know how sharp they were. It was done in an atmosphere of camaraderie and conviviality.

Q: I suppose we had sort of a condominium relationship with them.

BLOOD: No, no. They were the top dog.

Q: Were they?

BLOOD: Oh, yes.

Q: We didn't have sharp diversity of views on Afghanistan, did we?

BLOOD: No, no, we didn't. In fact, one of our AID contract groups was working with the finance ministry and, you know, how they would work. Say, the Russians would aid one sector of the economy, and we would aid a sector so there wouldn't be overlap. And we were working well this way. They built some roads; we built some roads. We helped out, we built one airport; they built some other airports. And they—

Q: But who did this coordination? We didn't sit down with the Russians and work out this—

BLOOD: No, no. The Afghans did the coordination. But with us and with the Russians. We didn't work directly with the Russians on that. But there was, I think, almost a tacit understanding that we accepted the fact that they provided the bulk of all the military aid, more economic aid than any other country, but that our aid gave the Afghans an alternative to sort of complete dependence upon the Soviets.

Q: What were the implications of being top dog to them? What does it mean to them politically? Do they have more access to the king?

BLOOD: Oh, they have more access. It also means that the Afghans wouldn't deliberately antagonize them.

Q: How did they treat them differently from the way we were treated? Any way you can distinguish—

BLOOD: No, I can't. I'm not really—it's hard to say because I never saw any of their dealings, but I don't think that they were—

Q: They weren't given greater preferences and seatings at official functions or anything like that?

BLOOD: Oh, no.

Q: Yes. Nothing obvious.

BLOOD: No. But I think on important issues, say in U.N. votes or action, certainly I think the Afghan government would think very carefully about taking an action that they knew the Soviets wouldn't like.

Q: What attention did Washington pay to Afghanistan at that time?

BLOOD: Well, in aid terms, quite a bit. I remember that there was another cut, I think, a government cut in that period of '65 to '68. I was surprised to see that Kabul was one of the thirty largest posts in the world because of our AID mission. It was a large AID mission. We had a large Peace Corps contingent there. We had a lot of Americans in Afghanistan and a lot of people on contract there. So in terms of economic assistance, you had within—this is before we really got involved in Egypt, of course—you had Jordan and—

Q: Still had a fair program in Iran.

BLOOD: Iran, yes. India. Pakistan was much more important. Jordan was important. India was important. But Afghanistan was up there in the top four or five in NEA.

Q: But—

BLOOD: While there, we had the big Hellman Valley project had been under way for years. It was a large effort.

Q: But did the assistant secretary visit Afghanistan? Who was the assistant secretary at that stage? Was it Luke Battle?

BLOOD: No. Harriman came out on one visit. He was the senior most American I think had came there when I was there. You would get some congressional visits I think largely because looking at the AID program.

But, no, I think from the political sort of leadership in Washington, there wasn't that much concern.

Q: Did American journalists visit with any regularity?

BLOOD: No, no.

Q: There were none stationed there?

BLOOD: No, we had none stationed there. They would come up from Pakistan or India from time to time. It was a relatively quiet period. At least we thought it was at the time.

Q: Did you have frictions with the AID mission at that post or was it similar to that—

BLOOD: No, not similar. Relationships were better. The ambassadors were able to exercise their authority over the AID missions.

Q: You had Ambassador Steeves.

BLOOD: And then Bob Neumann.

Q: Who was a political appointment.

BLOOD: He was a political appointee who came out.

Q: What change did you notice between the professional and the political appointee? Any?

BLOOD: Well, I think, actually, I would say Bob Neumann was a better ambassador than John Steeves. John Steeves was better at working with the American community. He was

very likable. He played a lot of bridge. He rode horses. He fished and golfed. I mean, he moved around a lot in the American community. He wasn't as good as a political analyst in dealing with the Afghan government than I think as Neumann was. Neumann was very effective in that. Very hard working. I'd say Neumann was a better ambassador than Steeves.

Q: All right.

BLOOD: And, of course, it was a little awkward for me because he inherited me.

Q: And how long did you stay with him after that?

BLOOD: I stayed until the end of my tour and then was succeeded by Bruce Laingen. In fact, I was promoted just at the end of the tour to class one. I was doing very well right then. So it was logical that I would move on to something else.

Q: Now you are up in the senior ranks of the Foreign Service. What's your opinion of the Foreign Service at this stage? How does it stack up? Still the view that you held in the beginning, that you were in a pretty sharp—

BLOOD: Oh, yes, yes. Things were going extremely well. Work was interesting.

Q: The quality of your associates though you felt was—

BLOOD: I thought it was still very, very high.

Q: Okay.

BLOOD: Then came actually, I think, a critical point in my career. I said I was promoted to class one, you know, February or so of 1968, and my tour was coming to an end in the summer. Of course, it was where would I want to go to next. And NEA came forth with

some suggestions that didn't—like political counselor in Ankara and Athens that didn't intrigue me too much.

Then Bill Hall, who had been the deputy chief of mission in Pakistan when I was in Dacca the first time, was assigned as ambassador to Ethiopia. And he wanted Chris Van Hollen as his DCM, but Chris was in Turkey, I think, and they wouldn't let him go. And so he asked me if I wanted to go. And I said yes. I thought, “Gee, DCM in Addis is a chance to break into Africa, you know. I think if you want to get an embassy there, if you had been DCM in Addis, you might get an African embassy might be possible there.” And I very much admired Bill Hall and Jane, his wife, and would love to work with them.

And then I suddenly got word that I had been transferred to Athens as political counselor. Subsequently, Bill Hall told me he thought I preferred Athens. And I said, “No, I never. If I'd had any choice, I would have jumped at Addis.” Because the troubles that Mike Crosby—I don't know if you remember Mike Crosby. He was serving as DCM in some African post. He had been in Greece when I had earlier. He was supposed to go as political counselor to Athens, but his ambassador was brought back as deputy secretary so he couldn't go. So the job was open. Since I was in NEA, they threw me into the breach.

But if I had gone to Addis, I think it would have been a completely different career because one reason I went to Dacca is because I was very unhappy in Athens.

Q: You really didn't want to get back into the Greek region again?

BLOOD: No, I didn't. And they asked me to—well, Phil Talbot was the ambassador. Phil Talbot had been assistant secretary in NEA after Rountree so I had worked with him and liked him. But when I got there, I realized in terms of rank, I would be about the fourth person in the embassy. I had been DCM and charg# in Afghanistan for a long period of time.

Also, the junta was in charge. The CIA was very supportive of the junta. CIA people had very close contacts with the junta. The political section, we were anti-junta.

Q: Why were you anti-junta?

BLOOD: Well—

Q: Because of your democratic values?

BLOOD: In part. I think in part because most of us in the political section had served in Greece before. We had known the Greek politicians. The military would serve the king. We were very fond of them. We didn't accept the argument that these people were baddies. Everybody that we had known before were bitterly opposed to the junta because they were political people.

I've never been in a post that was so divided.

Q: Well, what was the CIA rationale for support of the junta?

BLOOD: Well, a very good one really. Because the leadership of the junta had come out what the Greeks call the CIA which was the Greek military intelligence. And so they had been the normal working contacts of the CIA before the coup. Suddenly the people that they knew, their working contacts, were now the rulers of the country. So this was obviously advantageous to them, and they like them and worked with them.

Q: But you said the embassy was quite divided?

BLOOD: Well divided, yes. Well, primarily the military—and there were many, many Greek-Americans in the CIA and among the attach#s. We had also a large MAG mission. They were without exception, the Greek-Americans, 200 per cent for the junta. The people who were opposed were in the political section. Bob Keeley was my deputy there for a

while and bitterly opposed. And the USIA, I would say most of them were pretty unhappy with the junta. The economic section was sort of neutral.

Q: The DCM was McClelland?

BLOOD: DCM was Ross McClelland. Phil Talbot left in January after the election which brought in Mr. Nixon. And for the next year, over a year, there was no ambassador. And Ross was the DCM. I mean, Ross was the charg#.

Q: Why didn't we have an ambassador appointed?

BLOOD: Well, I think in part there was a feeling that you didn't want to show too much enthusiasm about the junta. I mean, there were many, many Greeks opposed to it. And they didn't get around to it until they appointed Henry Tasca, who didn't get there until, I think, January in 1970. And so most of my period was working with Ross as the DCM.

And he was in the very difficult position of running a divided embassy. It was really a bitterly fought struggle. The staff meetings were hostile. I've never been in a place where you couldn't, you know, as American officials speak frankly about the local government. But if you said anything mistaken as critical about members of the junta, the CIA would explode in anger.

Q: Would they relay it to the junta members?

BLOOD: I hope not. I doubt that. And then if they would, you know, started in staff meetings charges about political leaders that they were no damn good or can't be trusted, then I would rise to their defense. And there was much, much friction. And a lot of our military there felt that this regime was very popular. And our argument was “Well, if they are that popular, why don't they expose themselves to an election?”

“You don't need an election in a democracy, you know. They are popular. You can see that just by talking to people. That is our feeling.”

I admit it must have been very difficult for Ross McClelland at that time. Because Greece is a country in which if you have ever served there, you do get emotionally involved. Most people there were emotionally involved in that issue.

Q: But Washington was surely aware of the problem in the embassy. Did Washington not give guidance or take—

BLOOD: No. I think perhaps they wanted both views coming out. And then I heard that Tasca was coming as ambassador. And, actually, a friend of mine in the Foreign Service, Bill Crawford, who had served as Tasca's DCM in Rabat, wrote to me and said that, “I know both of you. I know you and he will not get along.” He didn't have a very high regard for Tasca. And I guessed that when Tasca came, he would opt for a particular position in support of the junta. And I was right in that.

Then the issue involved primarily then was the sale of military equipment to Greece: tanks, aircraft, artillery. The position that I took and the leader of the political section took was that, “Okay, we didn't mind selling it to the Greeks for NATO purposes but not on the justification that the rest of the CIA was using that this would bring them back to democracy. These people will never bring back Greece to democracy. And this is a lie. We will sell it to them only for purely security purposes and tell them that, but don't operate on the delusion that you are doing this as a way of encouraging democracy because that is just false.” Anyhow, then when Tasca came, he did say let's give them . . .

So that's when they, NEA, knowing that I wanted out, said there is this opening in Dacca. And they knew I had served there before. Would I be interested in going?

Q: This is 19—

BLOOD: '70. I guess the assignment was really firmed up at the end of—no, about the end of '69, the first part of '70. I left Athens in March '70 to go to Dacca. Actually, I was charg# because Ross went on home leave for a couple months. When Tasca arrived, I had been charg# for a month or so. It was I who greeted him when he came to Greece.

Q: When you left Athens in March—

BLOOD: This was direct transfer, yes.

Q: Direct. Did you have a feeling that the junta was there to stay indefinitely?

BLOOD: Oh, no.

Q: How do you think the issue between Greek opposition to the junta and its authoritarian policies were going to be resolved?

BLOOD: I didn't know. I didn't foresee that the junta would make such a stupid mistake over Cyprus that they would bring about their own downfall which was what happened. But I just felt that it was an anomaly that the Greeks wanted a democracy, that this was an abnormal situation, that sooner or later would fail. That was my feeling, but I didn't know when it would take place or how it would take place. I was rather pessimistic at the time seeing that they were in for a long haul, and Agnew had gone over right after I left to visit them. It looked like the United States was moving from a rather cool position to a warmer embrace of the junta.

Q: Did you think that whatever opposition there was the body politic would work against us in the future?

BLOOD: Oh, yes. Oh, yes, that's what we kept telling Washington that we are going to pay a price for supporting a non-popular government here, that the Greeks are going to remember this and hold it against us.

Q: But there was no reaction from Washington? Did you get any resonance from Washington to those arguments?

BLOOD: I think they—no, no, I can't remember any. But Washington was divided too. I mean, there was no, you know, great enthusiasm for the junta certainly. And as I say, it took us well over a year before we moved into a warmer relationship with them. And even then, I think they were still uneasy about it because the rest of the NATO countries were damning them and were unhappy with them. It wasn't, you know, a close embrace ever.

Q: In this division of American official opinion over the junta, where did the White House figure? Where did they come down? The Johnson Administration at least.

BLOOD: Well, my feeling is that they took sort of hands off approach; wait and see what would happen. And it was actually during the Nixon Administration that we moved toward a closer position.

Q: I see. But they were not activists in one way or another trying to encourage any kind of evolution of—

BLOOD: Oh, yes, we were always talking about we encourage a return to democracy, yes. The question was did you trust the junta to bring it about.

Q: I see.

BLOOD: And I didn't, and all of us didn't. Or did you think that well maybe like some people thought we would have nice law and order in a country, remember, was solidly behind us in NATO, cooperating with us militarily and every way they could. Maybe, you know, why worry about it? That was the thing in the short run, but we were arguing the long run that we are going to pay for this because the Greek people are not happy.

Q: Did you personally have much contact with the junta leadership?

BLOOD: No, and they didn't like—they liked their contacts with the people who were fully supportive, and they knew that we weren't.

Q: So if the State Department sent you an instruction to see someone at a high level, then you either had to have somebody else do it from CIA or you went to see somebody else—

BLOOD: Well, I don't think I ever got any such instruction. I don't think Ross did. I think the pattern was the CIA did it. But we had a fellow named—what was his name—[Peter Peterson] he was the consul general, who was a Greek-American, and he was very close to Patakos, who was number two in the junta. He often was used for this.

Q: All right. Any last minute thoughts on Athens before we move again?

BLOOD: No, except I think it was probably the most painful experience I had in the Foreign Service.

Q: Had you gotten a reputation by that time as a "troublemaker," if I can ask a direct question?

BLOOD: I don't think so, no.

Q: No.

BLOOD: I think Ross probably felt that I was difficult at times. Of course, you know, I would argue with him about—sometimes I was trying to protect Bob Keeley who was much, much, much more vehement than I was in his views, but he was working for me, and I was trying to protect him against, you know—Ross felt he went too far in his reactions to the junta.

Q: We have just completed Mr. Blood's assignment to Athens and in March of—March is it?

BLOOD: Of 1970.

Q: In March of 1970 you are assigned on direct transfer to Dacca in East Pakistan. Please go ahead.

BLOOD: I went to Dacca by way of consultation in Washington. That was the first time and only time I was ever sworn in. Because in those days when Bill Macomber was Under Secretary for Management he had initiated a program of swearing in consul generals in order to give that position more prestige and authority. So there was a little ceremony which he conducted in which I took the oath of office as principal officer in Dacca.

Q: It wasn't to signify that you had more independence than—

BLOOD: No, not at all. I hope I didn't take it to mean that way.

Going back to Dacca after, let's see, eight years absence was an interesting experience. I knew many people there, of course. But the situation had changed rather markedly. The impetus for a break away of East Pakistan from West Pakistan was much stronger. President Yahya's plan to move Pakistan away from martial law and back to a parliamentary democracy involving elections in both wings was, of course, the major issue and the excitement of the time and made for a great deal of very interesting political work.

The first crisis that we confronted was the massive cyclone of November 3rd, 1970, which we estimated later resulted in the death of 300,000 people.

Q: Before we get to that, what would you say were the reasons for this shift in Bengali attitudes against the government in West Pakistan—in East Pakistan?

BLOOD: Well, for one the—

Q: In West Pakistan.

BLOOD: The resentments of economic discrimination had more time to simmer, more time to surface. For another, the Bengalis were more politically organized. The Awami League had become clearer the dominant Bengali political organization, well led, very active. The 1965 war between Pakistan and India over Kashmir had further divided the two wings because East Pakistan . . . The people of East Pakistan weren't very appreciative of taking risk to secure gains in Kashmir. And, of course, everybody knew that the country was in for political transformation from military to civilian rule which made for a lot of opportunities.

The cyclone immediately, of course, brought many headaches to the consul general and the AID mission USIA there. I had remembered earlier a much smaller cyclone in 1962 where there had been some friction between the embassy and the consulate general in dealing with Washington. And I was determined to avoid that friction this time.

Q: What kind of friction occurred?

BLOOD: Well, requests for aid - how would they be funneled? Who would make the recommendations? And we worked out an arrangement with Ambassador Farland in Islamabad that we could initiate the recommendations for aid, but they would go through the embassy on the way to Washington. And Ambassador Farland sort of took himself charge of this operation and worked with us, with the provincial AID director in East Pakistan and with myself, very closely, more closely than with the members of his own staff in the embassy. I think thereby we were able to avoid some of the problems that do arise in situations like this.

We initially were under very great pressure from Washington to demand relief, which seems to be always the case. Then after a while, the impetus dries out and then you have to fight very hard to get anything at all in the way of relief supplies.

For example, we were asked whether we wanted a Army field hospital to be flown out. It would take many planes and much personnel. We had a doctor there, an American doctor,

who was on temporary duty from the Army, and he made a quick helicopter survey, and we endorsed his report which was that a field hospital was not necessary. I think it was the right decision. The Belgians subsequently sent out a field hospital which found little cyclone-related injuries with which to deal. Of course, there is always plenty of work for a hospital in treating chronic dysentery and other diseases and things like that. But the cyclone either drowned people or scraped up their arms, but other than that, did not result in many injuries.

It was ironic to learn that Senator Ted Kennedy was berating the State Department and US Government for not doing enough to help the survivors when we were really doing much more than was the government of Pakistan. And this was very obvious to the Bengalis. In fact, the international response on the part of the Soviets, and the British, and the Germans, and the Saudis, and the Iranians was very great. The only response that was nil or minimal was the response of the government of Pakistan. And we reported to Washington that the more we did, the worse we made the government of Pakistan look and this would have political ramifications which I think it did at the time of the elections a month later.

Q: Why didn't the government move more effectively? Were they simply incapable of doing so?

BLOOD: I'm not sure. Because on the earlier occasion of 1961 - '62, the government of Pakistan, particularly the Pakistani military had been very effective in their relief efforts. But this time, they didn't do much. The Pakistan Army cooperated with our helicopter unit we sent from Fort Bragg. The Pakistan Navy sent out press release after press release we just got in the way of the British Navy which was working very hard to bring relief by sea to the isolated islands.

It was almost as if they just didn't care. Yahya, the president, flew over East Pakistan on his way back from China for about an hour while the Pope and many other non-Pakistani

senior officials visited East Pakistan at that time which was occupying a great deal of media coverage in the world.

We had the problem, of course, of handling the media. We had only a few helicopters that were available and under our direction. The media naturally wanted to have almost exclusive use of the helicopters. We thought some of these helicopters should be engaged in dropping of relief supplies to isolated areas, but we managed to work out a fairly equitable deal, arrangement, with them. We knew we had to accommodate the media if we were to get continued support for relief activities.

Ambassador Farland came over to the east wing and was very helpful, particularly in dealing with the press. He got a very bum rap at that time because one American newsman—AP I believe—had reported erroneously that the helicopter in which the ambassador was riding, the blades had injured a Bengali who was trying to get a parcel of rice. This was not true. We found out later he based it completely on hearsay and had not bothered to try to corroborate it. The ambassador was very upset and went to some special lengths to try to correct this erroneous report. On our part, of course, we and the embassy just ostracized that reporter from then on, and he had no access to any American officials.

It was an exciting time, and I think the American role was a very helpful one in that operation. The Bengalis could see—it was a very visible role because our helicopters were flying in and out of the airport. So were the British and the Soviet helicopters. There was much evidence of international interest and concern and very little evidence of interest on the part of the government of Pakistan.

Q: And you said shortly thereafter elections had been scheduled.

BLOOD: Elections had been scheduled earlier but had been postponed because—well, actually elections were postponed because of some flooding earlier, and elections were held in December. Many people believed that the smashing victory scored by the Awami

League was traceable in part to the resentment felt by Bengalis over the rather diffident attitude taken by the government of Pakistan for the disaster relief operations.

Q: The Awami League, would you say it is something like an American political party with a right, a left, a center, or factions within it, or how would you describe it?

BLOOD: What the Awami League?

Q: Yes.

BLOOD: The Awami League was the Bengali Nationalist Party that favored autonomy for East Pakistan, favored better relations with India. I think in terms of the left-right spectrum, I would say it was the center left.

Q: What is pretty well unified parties?

BLOOD: At that time, yes. It was well organized, and they ran candidates in every one of the constituencies.

I remember the Pakistan ambassador to the United States, Mr. Hellali, visited East Pakistan after the disaster relief operation had been concluded but before the elections. And I had a gathering of my principal staff members with him. He asked us how we thought the election would turn out. And we said we thought the Awami League would win big. He was very angry. I remember he said, “Are you a Muslim?”

I said, “No.”

And he said, “Do you know what goes in the mind of the Bengali villagers?”

And I said, “No.”

And he said, “Well, I can tell you that they are going to vote the way the mullahs tell them, and they are not going to vote for the Awami League. And you are dead wrong. You have been taken in by these Bengalis.”

Well, I remember also that just before the elections when I called on Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the leader of the Awami League, he told me that they would win all but two of the 169 seats in the 300-man National Assembly allocated to East Pakistan. I reported this to Washington, but I didn't believe it. I thought that was an exaggeration. And it actually turned out to be right on the button. They lost only two out of the 169 seats which gave them a majority in the National Assembly.

Q: The population of East Pakistan is larger you said than of West Pakistan.

BLOOD: Yes. About fifty-five percent to forty-five percent.

Q: Well, didn't the government have any concern that that larger half might take control of the legislature and thereby the government? And didn't they have any knowledge of the Awami League's position?

BLOOD: I think that Ambassador Hellali was typical of their views. They expected that the more conservative parties like the Muslim League would do better than they did and that they did not foresee that the Awami League winning such a majority. Nor did they foresee Bhutto winning plurality in West Pakistan. The election was very honest, but I think the results surprised them a great deal.

Q: The authorities in the East made no effort to influence the outcome by throwing money in the right places?

BLOOD: Not that I know of. I wasn't aware of that. They may have to some extent, but . . . The feeling there was tangible; if you live there, you couldn't help but be aware of the strong sentiments in East Pakistan of—

Q: Did all of your staff think that CIA and USIA was—

BLOOD: Yes. We all gave the Awami League a large majority, but we varied, you know, whether it would be from seventy-five percent to ninety-five percent.

Q: If the Awami League was going to win big in East Pakistan and therefore take control of the government in the West as well, what kind of government did you think that would be in terms of its relationship with the United States?

BLOOD: The problem was that the program, the platform, of the Awami League were the famous six points which called for such a degree of autonomy for East Pakistan that it would not be—if applied, it's hard to see how you could very long maintain even a fiction of a unified country. My thinking was that the Awami League platform was a recipe for the dissolution of Pakistan, but it could be a recipe for the peaceful dissolution of Pakistan.

Q: How did you think American interests in the subcontinent would be affected by a Pakistan that had split into two pieces?

BLOOD: Well, that's a good question. We really debated that. We had, as I recall, perhaps in January of 1971, a meeting in the embassy in which all the constituent posts, Peshawar, Lahore, Karachi, Dacca, and the embassy, made contributions, and we were wrestling with this question of suppose Pakistan does come apart.

Q: This is after the—

BLOOD: After the elections but before the government military crackdown when there was still the possibility of a peaceful evolution.

Q: Well, how did this embassy debate go?

BLOOD: Well, as I remember, we sort of came to a conclusion that it would be in US interests preferable if Pakistan stayed together primarily for the reason that if East

Pakistan became independent, it would be another country very much in demand and requiring economic aid. Calls on us for economic assistance would be greater in the case of two Pakistans than one. But I don't recall any very strong reasons other than that for—or reasons why the United States' interests would be severely or even significantly damaged if the two countries should split apart. Well, we were then talking in terms of a peaceful split not a—

Q: Right.

BLOOD: Not one brought about by war or Indian intervention.

Q: But a weakened Pakistan would pose less of a balance to India in the subcontinent. Does that bother you at all? The security considerations of a split-up.

BLOOD: Well, I don't think that bothered us too much because I think you could also make the argument that East Pakistan was sort of a liability to West Pakistan. They could never defend it against India because it is surrounded virtually by India and separated by over a thousand miles. As events turned out, it was almost impossible to defend against India. It had come to be something of an economic drain on Pakistan. A truncated Pakistan might be, economically, more viable than a united Pakistan.

Q: What was the attitude towards India in this—I don't know that it is probably called a crisis at this stage—but was it felt that India was going to intervene in some fashion, or how were Indians' interests going to be protected did you Americans think at that time?

BLOOD: I don't think we worried about that. I mean, in Pakistan we weren't worrying about that too much. We thought that India would welcome and perhaps try to encourage the breakup figuring that they would be on good terms with East Pakistan. India and the Awami League were on very good terms.

Q: What about the Soviet Union and China, the great powers? Did they figure into your calculations as you looked at the situation developing for Pakistan?

BLOOD: Well, I remember the ambassador had advanced the idea, which none of us believed, that China had a great interest in East Pakistan as a way of getting access to the Bay of Bengal and therefore would . . . But China really was very supportive of Pakistan, the government of Pakistan, and was staunchly opposed to any movement toward autonomy on the part of the East Pakistanis. Soviet, no—this, of course, all happened before the Indo-Soviet Peace Treaty which took place in August of 1971.

We were looking at it in terms of US interests, in terms of a peaceful political evolution assuming that Bhutto in West Pakistan and Mujib in East Pakistan wouldn't be able to work closely together in a framework of the united Pakistan, and they would choose to go their separate ways.

Q: So after these elections and the Awami League victory . . .

BLOOD: Of course there were negotiations between Mujib and Bhutto and Yahya which weren't getting anywhere. The National Assembly elected in December was scheduled to be convened March 3rd. On March 1st, President Yahya, yielding to pressure from Bhutto, announced the indefinite postponement of the convening of the National Assembly. I think this was the key event that started the chain of events that led to the Indo-Pak war.

Q: What did Bhutto hope to achieve through that postponement? What could be gained by more time? What could be accomplished in that time?

BLOOD: Well, I think he tried to get Mujib to back away from insistence on the six points. Perhaps block Mujib from becoming the prime minister which, of course, he was entitled to do because he had clear majority in the National Assembly. Or just stalling for time because he knew that if the National Assembly were convened, Mujib would be elected

prime minister, and the most he could hope for would be leader of the opposition or perhaps foreign minister in a coalition government.

When we heard over the radio the announcement of the postponement, we went up on the roof of Adamji Court, which was the building that houses the consulate general, and we could see Bengalis pouring out of office buildings all around that neighborhood. Angry as hornets. They were just like a spontaneous demonstration of wrath because they had believed Yahya. He would hold elections, they would run the elections, and now they were being denied the fruits of victory.

The embassy, that same day, sent off a message to Washington with a copy to us saying they thought this was a very shrewd decision on Yahya's part to defuse the situation. I commented rather bluntly that we saw it completely different. That just seeing this spontaneous reaction made me feel, I said that I've seen the beginning of the breakup of Pakistan. I was chastised by Washington that said, “Please no more hyperbole.”

But it was the beginning. And the embassy being so far away from it could not really, I think, accurately evaluate the anger in East Pakistan. And then that's when sort of the, you might say, revolt began in which the Awami League in effect took over the government of East Pakistan and began to act as if they were government. The army sort of stuck to its barracks clearly building towards a crisis.

I had the problem then of deciding whether or not to evacuate the American community because—

Q: This is March of—

BLOOD: March. The crackdown was on the evening of March 25th. I still remember that night vividly. We had invited some Bengalis and some members of the consular corps to dinner and to see a film called “Stella Dallas”—no, “Cass Kimberling” with Lana Turner and Spencer—what's his name?

Q: Spencer Tracy?

BLOOD: Spencer Tracy, yes. And just toward the end of the movie, I had a call from my CIA colleague who had gotten down to the office. Obstructions were in the road. Some Bengalis had cut down trees, and the army was beginning to move. And so we—

Q: Was there violence that provoked this? What provoked this crackdown?

BLOOD: Well, what had happened was that Yahya, who was joined by Bhutto, came over to Dacca for talks with Mujib to see if they could straighten this out. We had no contact with the Pak officials at that time.

Q: Why not?

BLOOD: Huh?

Q: Why not?

BLOOD: Well, most of them were—the people that we had known, the governor and the general officer commanding, had been withdrawn. We found out later because they had objected to the idea of a military crackdown.

Q: Oh.

BLOOD: And so they had been withdrawn. And, of course, the president's entourage had come over. They were secluded with Bhutto and Mujib. We still had contacts with the Awami League. From them, we had the impression that it was just like a roller coaster. I mean, for a moment, they looked optimistic, then be pessimistic, then look optimistic again. But then suddenly on the afternoon of the 25th, Yahya broke off the talks, and he and Bhutto flew back to the West wing. And then that night, the military moved in their brutal crackdown.

Q: There was substantial violence beforehand?

BLOOD: No, it was later claimed there had been . . . The Bengalis had torn down Pakistani flags that they had seen. Some of the bazaars had refused to sell supplies to the Pakistan Army. But there had been very little violence. One case, an American secretary had been accosted by some Bengalis. She reported it to me. I called the Awami League, and they said, “We will take care of it. You will have no more problems on this score.” And we didn't. They were the de facto government. So we were dealing with them in that period from about March 5 to March 25; a very short period before the crackdown.

Q: Now, the embassy was, I assume, in touch with the authorities in the West. Were they trying to persuade them in any direction or the other? I mean, what was the American position on how this crisis should be handled?

BLOOD: I'm not aware that we had any position or were trying to exert any—

Q: It was an internal matter, and we were not—

BLOOD: Yes.

Q: What about yourself in the East?

BLOOD: No, I wasn't trying. I was just trying to find out what was going on.

Q: Were you talking to Mujib?

BLOOD: No, not Mujib himself but with the people close to him. And—

Q: But you were—

BLOOD: And I think it was made clear our hope was for some sort of a peaceful political solution to the problem. And we were—

Q: But you had no desire to recommend.

BLOOD: No, no.

Q: Well, what was your feeling then from your conversations? Did you think things were headed for—

BLOOD: I didn't think the Pak military would crackdown. We were aware, of course, they were reinforcing their garrisons in East Pakistan because we went to the airport and we would see these PIA planes arrive full of young men in khaki slacks and white shirts, all about the same age, who would be marched off the plane into trucks. We knew that they were soldiers. But it just seemed to us that a military crackdown would end up by precipitating the separation of the wings, as it did. I mean, it was a desperate action.

I think a lot of Pak military though genuinely believed they could cow the Bengalis. Very many of them had a very arrogant attitude toward the Bengalis whom they thought as artistic and non-martial and cowardly and people who could never stand up to tough measures.

Q: What was the crackdown, precisely? Barricades in the streets; what else?

BLOOD: Oh, no, no. The crackdown was . . . They deliberately set out first to destroy any Bengali units in Dacca which might have a military capability. These included what was called the East Pakistan Rifles who were officered by West Pakistanis but had Bengali troops. They were sort of a paramilitary organization that was charged with border security and the police. And so they just attacked their barracks and killed all of them that they could.

Q: When you say destroy, you literally mean destroy.

BLOOD: Oh, yes, yes.

Q: Not order them to other units.

BLOOD: Oh, no. They just tried to destroy them and kill them all they could. And the police headquarters.

Q: And these were unprovoked attacks?

BLOOD: Oh, yes, they were unprovoked attacks. They also attacked the university, Dacca University, because the students had been active in this period, you know, with demonstrations. They machine-gunned, I guess used mortars too, against the dormitories and killed a large number of students. They brought up tanks before the building that housed the major Awami League newspaper and blew it up.

Q: What about the Awami League—

BLOOD: They attacked the bazaars that had denied food to the troops and destroyed them. They went to the university and murdered Hindu professors. One of them I knew particularly was an elderly man, philosopher, who didn't have a political bone in his body. I think he was killed solely because he was a Hindu.

Q: What about the leadership of the Awami League?

BLOOD: They were arrested, if they could find them, like Mujib. The others went into hiding. A lot of them did escape.

Q: What about the activities at the embassy? Were you circumscribed by the military authorities? Did they tell you to stay at home?

BLOOD: Oh, yes. Well, there was a curfew. We were not allowed to move about for, I think, about thirty-six hours. We went up on the roof, though, that night, and we could

watch, we could see, the battles raging. You could see the tracers and hear the tanks firing, machine guns. You could see those things.

Then the telephone lines were all cut. I found out later that the Pakistanis had cut those to prevent communications with resistance although they blamed the Awami League for cutting phone lines. We were out of telephone communications. Luckily, we had radio communications with the office and with our homes.

We were pretty much out of touch with our own embassy for about at least three weeks. They wouldn't allow anybody from the embassy over. And see there were no telephones. We had cables. That was it. And then toward the end of the three weeks, they allowed me to call the ambassador on a military phone on which I could speak to him. We were in cablecom communications, but they weren't allowed to get over there.

Luckily, we had the air attach# from the embassy who had been there before the crackdown. I had asked for him to come over. And he was very, very helpful because we were, in effect, reporting war from March 25th on, a civil war. He was the only American military person there. The British also had the foresight to get one of theirs over in time, too, so we could have some competent military advice in reporting the struggle.

Q: Was he able to fly his plane around the country?

BLOOD: Oh, no, no. He came over on a commercial flight.

Q: Were the Indians active at this point in helping guerrilla movements?

BLOOD: No, no. I don't think they had been active before.

Q: Now how did the embassy react? I assume you reported all this pretty much as you described it here. But how did the embassy react to this?

BLOOD: With disbelief. They, of course, were being told by the government of Pakistan that nothing much had happened. And this attitude of disbelief began to show up in their comments and their messages which was very depressing. I mean, people like the DCM, Sid Sober, who had entered the Service with me were close friends and still are. I remember when he came over. I guess he was the first one over before the ambassador in late April when the government of Pakistan lifted the ban and after we had—I'll get to the evacuation in a minute—evacuated women, children, and nonessential dependents. And you could see that he just didn't believe it because a couple of Bengalis told him really nothing had happened.

Q: The big crisis was over. I mean—

BLOOD: Yes. The initial fighting . . . It took about two weeks before the Pak Army managed to defeat and drive out—at least across the border into India—most of the organized resistance to them. But what had happened then was, of course, a guerrilla type resistance grew up and spread.

Of course, now came the question of the evacuation. Even before the March 25th crackdown, a number of the foreign communities had been evacuated. The U.N., French, Germans, Japanese evacuated their communities.

Q: Had there been some attacks on foreigners?

BLOOD: No, there had been no attacks, but there was anticipation that we were headed toward a civil war. I had decided against evacuation for two reasons primarily. One was I knew with the Awami League in control that Americans were not in danger. Americans were very highly thought of. Nobody felt any sense of personal danger. Also, I felt that if we pull out, it would signal we sort of accepted the inevitability of a civil war and a conflict. If we stayed, then it was sort of evidence that we thought there was still some chance for a settlement.

Q: Did that make you nervous about putting your fellow Americans at risk?

BLOOD: Yes, oh, yes. It's a very awesome responsibility because you have to make judgments—I was under no pressure from the American community to pull out.

Q: What about Washington? Did they want you to do one thing or the other?

BLOOD: No. Well, the ambassador, who was undergoing some medical treatment in Thailand, sent me a message saying, “My only advice to you is err on the side of caution.” I wasn't quite sure what that meant.

But then after the military crackdown, the situation changed drastically. Now Washington found it hard to believe that Americans could be in danger once the Pak military was in control. But we were.

Q: In danger from what? From whom?

BLOOD: From the Pak military.

Q: Oh.

BLOOD: There were several instances of Americans being . . . Well, I should explain first that among the troops sent to East Pakistan, there were troops that were not regular army. There were frontier levies from the northwest frontier province who were not front line troops. There were several instances where Americans had been threatened at gunpoint by soldiers and told that they were going to be killed immediately. There were other instances where soldiers would leave their—

[End Tape 2, Side 1. Begin Tape 2, Side 2]

Q: We were discussing the evacuation.

BLOOD: Yes. I mentioned that our people were in danger from these semi-disciplined Pakistani troops. On several occasions, the Pakistani soldiers would leave the barracks in the evening and rob American houses. In one case, they took the watch off an American wife at gunpoint. In another case, an American confessed to me that he had actually killed a Pakistani soldier who had tried to kill him and had buried the body. It was beginning . . .

We were also harboring, all of us were harboring, Bengalis, mostly Hindu Bengalis, who were trying to flee mostly by taking refuge with our own servants. Our servants would give them refuge. All of us were doing this. I had a message from Washington saying that they had heard we were doing this and to knock it off. I told them we were doing it and would continue to do it. We could not turn these people away. They were not political refugees. They were just poor, very low-class people, mostly Hindus, who were very much afraid that they would be killed solely because they were Hindu.

Q: Did you have Hindu servants?

BLOOD: We had some. We all had a mixture of Muslim and Hindu servants. They worked very closely together, well together. So this was another danger. I don't think if I had ordered the community to stop that they would have stopped. It was just a humanitarian gesture that really was essential. It was really a humanitarian gesture that was being undertaken by our own servants out of humanity to fellow Bengalis.

I had had a squad of Bengali police who had been camped in a tent on my front yard because earlier there had been some left-wing death threats against me. The East Pakistan police had sent this unit to guard my residence. When the fighting began, of course, they were fearful of their lives so they took off their uniforms and buried their rifles in my back yard. Then later, the NCO in charge approached me and said that he had done nothing during the fighting. He wanted to return the rifles to the Pak Army, but would I go and vouch for him.

So I took him and the rifles to the nearest Pak military quarters and swore that what this gentleman had been doing and why he had the rifles in my yard and what he had done with them and that I could see him not taken apart. I hope he escaped safely.

Anyhow, so I decided to recommend to Washington that we evacuate.

Q: This was—

BLOOD: This would have been about mid-April. Washington's tone, which heretofore had been, “Anything you say, just give the word,” suddenly changed. “Now wait a minute. Let's think this out. Are you sure you want to do this?”

I had, of course, pointed out that we knew full well that an evacuation by us now would be taken amiss by the government of Pakistan because they were claiming that everything was peaceful. So if the Americans evacuate, obviously we didn't think they were peaceful. But I said I think that the safety of the American community overrides that consideration.

They finally agreed to the evacuation, but the government of Pakistan insisted that we fly from Dacca to Karachi and use PIA planes. The same planes that were bringing over military reinforcements then could be used to evacuate our people on the round trip. This was upsetting because the evacuation plan, which had been worked out before, was for US Air Force planes from Thailand to take us to Bangkok which is only two hours away and a similar climate and a place to which we could get to visit our families more readily.

Washington agreed to the Pakistan demand. So our wives, children, and nonessential employees had to fly from Dacca to Sri Lanka to Karachi, which is the same length of time as going from New York to London. They were being flown by crews which were absolutely exhausted because they were ferrying troops back and forth. The government of Pakistan was, I guess, apprehensive that some of our people would leave the plane in

Sri Lanka so they insisted on picking up their passports from them as they boarded the plane to be returned only in Karachi.

Q: Why were they so desirous of having your people arrive in West Pakistan?

BLOOD: Well, they were going from there to Tehran.

Q: Why did they care whether they went—

BLOOD: Well, first of all, Washington agreed to say we should describe it as a thinning out, not as an evacuation. Of course, it was an evacuation. And if they went out in so-called commercial PIA flights, it wouldn't look as strong an action as if the US Air Force came and picked them up and took them out.

Q: Right.

BLOOD: I'm not sure why they wanted . . . And, of course, PIA was going back to Karachi anyhow. So they spent a night in Karachi and then flew on to Tehran. But this disgruntled a large number of the American community there. Many of them—

Q: These were all dependents plus all private Americans, or who was being evacuated?

BLOOD: Dependents, nonessential employees, private Americans. We also smuggled out several Bengali spouses of American citizens.

Q: That may have been one of the reasons Pakistanis wanted control of the exit. They didn't want people to leave who they—

BLOOD: But they didn't block them anyhow. You could just walk through with your spouse with your passport and get out.

But I could sense, you know, from Washington's reaction that they weren't too happy with this decision to evacuate. I also knew—as the person on the spot who says evacuate, and

if they overrule me and something should ever happen, they [would blame me]. I really thought it was.

Our people wanted to go. They were desperate to go mostly because they were very angry. They were angry against our government for having . . . See, the Washington attitude had been there was nothing going on there. These people had seen all this happening. They were angry at the US government's failure to denounce the atrocities. I mention that too frankly. I know that some of these people when they get back, they are going to go to congressmen and the press, and they are going to complain. But you can't muzzle that. You can't keep them here. I mean, they can go out commercially if they want to. And it's bound to come out sooner or later.

Q: What about the American press? Weren't they covering the events?

BLOOD: Well, the American press had been all—on the day after the evacuation, all the foreign press had been trundled up and expelled.

Q: Ah. On the day of evacuation?

BLOOD: Oh, no, no, no. They were just sent out on planes before the evacuation.

Q: The crackdown. When were they sent out?

BLOOD: I think the 26th of March.

Q: Oh, I see. There were no American press.

BLOOD: No, there were a couple, one of whom came in surreptitiously over the border, one who escaped hiding. We hid him. We hid him in our house so they could keep reporting.

Q: Could they get their reports out?

BLOOD: Yes.

Q: Did you send their reports out, too?

BLOOD: Yes. Also, we were—in fact, I never read so many other people's mail as at that time because in this period of evacuation, the commercial wireless was also cut. So we had our own communications, of course, the consul general. We weren't relying on Pakistan facilities.

But other smaller officers didn't. So the Japanese and Nepalese and others, when they organized their own evacuation, they did it through us. We would send, say, a message to Kathmandu at our embassy which then relayed it to the Nepalese government who would then come back through us. I would give the message to the Nepalese consul general. Same with the Japanese. Later on when the Canadian high commissioner came over, of course they had no facilities, so we transmitted their—Washington okayed this—transmitted their reports and so forth.

Q: As we know, you and your colleagues at the post became seriously at odds with people in Washington. What would you say marked the division between good relations and the sour relationships that seemed to—

BLOOD: Well, you have to remember that it was really Nixon and Kissinger and their people against the bureaucracy, as we found out later. I was a real part of the bureaucracy. We discovered when we went back to Washington virtually everybody in the State Department felt the same way we did.

Q: But when in the field, you didn't have that—

BLOOD: We didn't know that in the field. You know, you know how instructions come out of the Department, you don't know usually who is writing them. I really was not aware until

I came back that our position had had such strong support at least among the working levels in NEA and elsewhere in the government.

Q: But you did have a feeling that you and Washington were—

BLOOD: Yes.

Q: Had different views on how this crisis would be managed in terms of US interests.

BLOOD: Well—

Q: Or the perception of the way things were developing. What I was getting at was is there a particular point, was it the evacuation, was it earlier reports, where is it that you think you took a step down or up, as you prefer to call it?

BLOOD: A little hard to pinpoint, but it would be right after March 25th when we began to report the crackdown. I will admit we did it very bluntly. We didn't disguise it in diplomatic niceties. We talked about, you know, 5,000 people probably being slaughtered that night. Things like that. We also had evidence. Of course, I mean, I never saw anybody murdered myself, but we had Catholic priests out in the countryside who . . . When Hindu villages were machine-gunned by the Pakistan Army, these people would flee to the Catholic mission for sanctuary. We sent American doctors up there to treat their wounds. Actually, we didn't send them; they went up there on their own. So these were American eyewitness reports of atrocities which we were reporting.

Q: And the embassy—

BLOOD: But, of course, the dissent message was what—

Q: Before we get to that, the embassy's view. How did they mesh with you all? Were they supportive, critical, were they just hands off? How did they handle your reporting? They must have had some idea.

BLOOD: Yes. As I recall it, they sort of disbelieved that we were reporting accurately.

Q: You weren't saying what they wanted to hear.

BLOOD: Yes, right.

Q: When did you file this dissent message?

BLOOD: I forget the exact date.

Q: Yes.

BLOOD: It would have been—

Q: After the evacuation?

BLOOD: No, before the evacuation.

Q: In April.

BLOOD: Before the evacuation. Early to mid-April. Actually, the dissent message was drafted by twelve or thirteen people on my staff. I did not draft it. They came to me and said we want to send this statement, we are so upset with the US failure to denounce the atrocities. They were all key people in AID, USIA. My own deputy didn't, but he was a weak officer. I think he decided he was too scared or something. But everybody whose opinion I respected had participated.

So I decided to send it, and I transmitted it. But I transmitted it along with a strong supportive statement. I said, “I had not personally drafted this. It was presented to me. But these are my best officers. I believe in what they are saying. I accord with their sentiments completely,” and sent it off.

Now, I think we sent it secret [limited distribution].

Q: Henry Kissinger said you sent it at such a low classification, it was sure to leak.

BLOOD: Yes, that's not true. I should have sent it up. Secret [limited distribution] was the highest thing we were used to using. Now there is EXDIS that at the time was higher. EXDIS, eyes only, I should have done that. Now I recognize that. But at the time, I used the highest classification that we were accustomed to using. There certainly was no intention, that's not true. That's just his supposition, but I can assure you that's not true. Any of it.

We sent it to the embassy and to Washington and the other posts in Pakistan. Of course, the embassy immediately grabbed it away from the other posts.

Q: What was the embassy's reaction? Did it comment on the message?

BLOOD: Well, their action, of course, was to take it away from the other posts. I don't recall. The ambassador and I never had any harsh words during this time, ever.

Q: But the ambassador was not someone to have harsh words. Farland, right? I mean, he was—

BLOOD: Oh, yes.

Q: He was a mild-mannered gentleman.

BLOOD: Oh, he could be pretty tough when he wanted to be.

Q: I mean, Sid Sober—

BLOOD: He and I always got along well.

Q: Sid Sober was a much more definite personality in my opinion.

BLOOD: Yes, but Sid and I, of course, were friends of long standing, close friends.

No, I mean, I knew when we sent it, they wouldn't like it. I mean, we are not that dumb.

Q: After all, you wouldn't have sent a dissent message if you thought—

BLOOD: No. Remember, this is just about the time that the idea of dissent messages was being heard about.

Q: Right.

BLOOD: We had been reading about the possibility of dissent messages.

Q: So you got no particular reaction to you from the embassy. What about from Washington? Did someone reply and say you are right or you are wrong? Did you get any indication that it had been read back there?

BLOOD: Oh, we began to get newspaper, but when—

Q: It leaked.

BLOOD: When it leaked. Then we knew it had leaked. And then I—I don't know, maybe about a couple weeks later—I'm trying to think how I got the word I ought to ask for a transfer.

Q: Who did you get that word from?

BLOOD: I'm trying to think. It may have been Sid. That didn't bother me after then so understand.

Q: But you didn't ask for a transfer, did you?

BLOOD: No, then I did.

Q: Oh, you did?

BLOOD: Oh, they said to do it.

Q: They said, "Ask for a transfer."

BLOOD: Yes. And I was due for home leave. I had gone on a direct transfer from Athens. I hadn't had home leave for a long time. So I asked for home leave and transfer and then the word came back to the apartment. Things were sort of interesting there. I wasn't in any hurry to leave so I stayed until about mid June. I did get one, I guess, indication from Sid who said, "When are you leaving?" Oh, politely done. But they were obviously hoping I would get out of there. But I wasn't in any great hurry to go. I mean, I knew I had to go, but I was sort of enjoying . . .

The situation was so interesting. We were down to about thirteen officers. The other countries' offices were also down to a few staff. Incidentally, the British deputy high commissioner left the same day I did for the same reason. And the Iranian was stopped by the Paks because he had visited the Indian deputy high commissioner who was under house arrest there. The Paks didn't like that. They brought the attention of the Shah's government, and they pulled him out.

I visited the Indian deputy high commissioner twice but on instructions. The Pakistani deputy high commissioner in Calcutta had been put under similar house arrest in Calcutta. Our consul general there or somebody in his staff had visited him and taken something to drink or reading materials and kept up contact and sent messages on his behalf back to New Delhi. This was quid pro quo. So on two occasions, I called on the Indian, who was a good friend, and I was allowed to by the Pak Army. They had him under house arrest. And

I visited with him. But this was done with Pak knowledge and only because in Calcutta, we were performing similar service for Pakistani officials in the same situation.

Q: How did the leak of your dissent message affect your ability to do business in Dacca? Could you talk to Bengali political intellectuals?

BLOOD: No, they were either dead or in hiding. Of course, the Pak military officials were very anxious to talk to us because there was evidence that we accepted them.

General Kikakan, who is now, I think, governor of Punjab, was sent over as governor. He is a lieutenant general in the army and had a reputation of being a very tough guy in Baluchistan earlier. When he was sworn in—this was right after the crackdown—I declined to go. I sent a junior officer instead. And I knew he wanted me to call on him. I stalled. One afternoon as I was leaving work, a Pak Army captain with a revolver in a jeep came by and said, “The governor has instructed me to escort you to his office.” So I went out there. We had a pleasant chat. Then the next day in the paper, “American Consul General Calls on the Governor.” But I did it at gunpoint. [Laughter]

Q: So you left.

BLOOD: I left in June, yes.

Q: In June. And when you came back to Washington, what kind of reception did you find?

BLOOD: Sisco was unhappy. He blamed me for leaking the message or at least giving it too low a classification. Nick Veliotes arranged for me to see Irwin, who was then deputy secretary. He was much friendlier. He wanted to know what I thought about the prospects of Indian intervention and asked my views. He was very nice. I think he genuinely—I think Nick had put him up to it. Nick said, “You ought to talk to this guy.” Those were the two major impressions.

Then I went on leave to Colorado. I joined my wife. And then I guess Howie Schaffer called me up to tell me that I had won the Herter award and please come back to Washington to receive it. I guess it was only then that I really feel, you know, that my peers at least applauded the action.

Later on, I talked to Chris Van Hollen. Chris was very helpful because by then I got a copy of my efficiency report which Sid Sober had written in which he had said a couple things which I took strong issue with it. One was that I had in fact encouraged the American community to be critical of the US government's handling of the situation. Of course, that is not true. I said that it was a genuine feeling that everybody felt, and I didn't have to encourage it. I didn't do anything to encourage it. I shared it, but I didn't encourage it. And a couple other things like that. Chris—Joe Sisco refused to make a comment, but Chris, I think, put his neck on the limb, and he wrote a supplementary review statement. And then also that I hadn't behaved properly in Washington. And I objected to that, too.

Q: In Washington?

BLOOD: I was called up to testify before the Senate judicial subcommittee which also handled refugees. Ted Kennedy's subcommittee. When they started asking sensitive questions, I said we would have to go to an executive session, they stopped it then. There wasn't anything the Department could have objected to at all in that testimony. Chris said, you know, we have cooperated completely with the Department, and we have no objection to anything that he has done. Of course, Sid wasn't even in Washington then. He was home in Islamabad. I was still a loyal Foreign Service officer.

Q: But you didn't see Kissinger, I'm sure.

BLOOD: What?

Q: You didn't see Kissinger at that time.

BLOOD: Oh, no. He was, of course, over—

Q: In the White House.

BLOOD: Sisco . . . Rogers, of course, he had to give me the award at the meeting. I think he was a little embarrassed about that. I think this whole thing put him in—I'm sure Kissinger probably said, “Look at your State Department people. They can't even follow instructions.”

Q: Now who took your place in Dacca at that time?

BLOOD: Well, my deputy was Bob Carle. He acted briefly and then—oh, gee, who is the guy who took my place?

Q: Was George Griffin there?

BLOOD: No.

Q: No.

BLOOD: George never served in Dacca. He served in Calcutta, he served in New Delhi, served in Kos.

The person who took my place got into the same trouble I did. He went out there, and he was there after the war when Mujib returned in triumph to Dacca. He was instructed not to go to the airport to meet him, and he did. He was bounced out.

Q: But did you continue to follow in that—

BLOOD: Oh, yes, pretty close.

Q: Did the Department ever ask your advice or call you for consultation?

BLOOD: No.

Q: What was your next assignment then?

BLOOD: Personnel.

Q: Oh, you went back to Personnel.

BLOOD: Yes.

Q: Was it all inevitable, in your opinion?

BLOOD: I think the breakup of Pakistan was inevitable from the beginning.

Q: Kissinger says he felt that was the case himself. Did you get a sense that Washington thought Pakistan was going to split asunder?

BLOOD: No, I don't think that was Washington's viewpoint. I think that the hope had been all along that this country would stay together.

Q: But Kissinger said that he felt that it was indeed going to happen. What could we have done to make it easier? I mean, what could have been done at what stage to make that division less violent, less traumatic, for the region? Or could it have been avoided? Could there have been a peaceful splitting of the two Pakistans?

BLOOD: I don't see how we could have intervened effectively in the negotiations beforehand. I mean, there is an election. People are trying to decide how to handle the results of an election.

Q: We couldn't have given the Pakistanis some advice on this that they might have taken? Was it just simply too close to the core of Pakistan's being for us—

BLOOD: I think so, I think so. What we could have done is, I think, we could have cracked down. I mean, we could have expressed our unhappiness and dismay with the Pakistani military crackdown on March 25th and told them in no uncertain terms that this is a sure way of spelling the death of a united Pakistan.

Q: But what would that have done for us? If we had come down hard against the Pak government for their handling of that crackdown, what consequences might have flowed from that?

BLOOD: It might not have dissuaded the Paks from continuing, but it would have positioned ourselves on the side of right and justice, and we would have been doing the—

Q: More self-respect.

BLOOD: Yes, yes. And sometimes that's the best thing to do. I mean, more often than not, it's the best thing to do because you do pay a penalty for it. We paid a penalty for it certainly in our relations with India. I mean, we got more and more involved on the losing side of a conflict. The only valid reason is to protect the opening to China. And, of course, none of us knew anything about that.

Q: There was no indication of that whatsoever, is that right?

BLOOD: No, no, not at all.

Q: Okay, so then you went back to Personnel, unless you have further reflections.

BLOOD: No, I went back to Personnel. I was fairly lucky largely in working for Cleo because we decided to reorganize the assignment section. In fact, we turned the clock back to the way it was before. In the interval, they had made a class system, you know, instead of by bureaus, which we thought was absurd. So we did. We rebuilt it the way it was.

Then when Cleo was charged with the Foreign Service assignments division, I was his deputy. Then he moved up to the assistant director for assignments, and I took over. Then when he went to Sudan, I moved over to his position.

Then through a series of sort of unexpected developments, I found myself just as Kissinger was coming back to the State Department as acting director general of the Foreign Service. Because Bob Brewster was director of personnel, and then he got an embassy, Ecuador. So they needed somebody to be acting director of Personnel. So I was—Bill Hall who was the director general picked me. So I became acting director of Personnel. Then Bill Hall went to—no, he had been ambassador to Ethiopia, and he was told he wasn't going to get another ambassadorial assignment so he resigned. Quickly. Just like that. And so I became acting director general and had that job for several months. Then Kissinger came in, and he picked Nat Davis to be DG.

Q: He didn't call you in and say—

BLOOD: Oh, no, I never even saw him. I did see him once. When I was acting director general, he was invited to the book fair and inspect that. So I went up with a couple of the ladies to escort him down. I gave him my name, but he—

Q: Didn't react?

BLOOD: Didn't react. But then Nat asked me, “Well, you know, what would you like to do?”

I said, “Well, of course, you know, like everybody else, I would like to get an embassy.”

And he said, “Well, I'll—”

But I said, “I've always felt that since, you know, Dacca and particularly Mr. Kissinger as Secretary, my chances were nil.”

He said, “Okay, we will give it a try.” And my name went up for, I think, upper Malta.

Anyhow, then Nat had asked me to go out to represent him in India at a conference. I had just come back from that, and he called me at home. He said, “When the Secretary recognized who that was, he hit the roof, and he said, 'Get that guy out of Washington.' So you have got to get out of Washington. Where do you want to go? I mean, fast.”

I said, “Well, I know that Herman Halsis is going home, leaving the Army War College. I've been there as a student and liked it, what about that?”

And Nat said, “Okay, we'll work that out.”

And so I suddenly went up to Carlisle.

Q: And you stayed there . . .

BLOOD: I stayed there until the Carter Administration came in. And then my name—earlier I had tried through Personnel and found out that—

Q: Still no—

BLOOD: Still no chance, just forget it putting my name up for anything halfway decent. We were enjoying it in Carlisle even though from a career point of view, it wasn't a helpful assignment. The State Department didn't know what I was doing there and couldn't care less.

Q: Right.

BLOOD: But the Army were very, very courteous. Then there came, you know, putting my name up for a number of possibilities. When the—

Q: New Delhi.

BLOOD: New Delhi one came through, and I went down and met with Ambassador Goheen and hit it off and got a job.

Q: And now you went out to New Delhi in—

BLOOD: October 1, 1977. I left October 1, 1981. Four years to the day, yes.

Q: So all right. This is your first assignment to India. You had been on the other side of the line.

BLOOD: Right. I had been on the other side.

Q: What's your sense of dealing with the Indians as opposed to dealing with Pakistanis?

BLOOD: New Delhi is the capital of South Asia. It's the big city. People are much more, I would say, accessible and open and frank and argumentative than in the other countries so I enjoyed that. It was like the big leagues.

Q: Did you feel that there was this bias or tilt towards India in the Department that Kissinger describes in his books? That is, the Department felt that India being the largest, most powerful country in the subcontinent, it's the one we ought to pay more attention to instead of Pakistan which he and Nixon sort of favored. Was there that disposition to give —

BLOOD: I think so. I think that many of us who served in Pakistan also like the Paks, fond of Pakistan, but have always been sort of suspicious of this idea that Pakistan is an ally of the United States. They are really not. I mean, our interests aren't that close. They can be cooperative at times, but they are not an ally in the sense, you know, of Britain or Germany or France even. They are in it for their own purposes, mostly to build up strength against India.

No, I think most of us who served in that area recognized that India is the dominant power and will become even more so over time.

I liked working with the Indians, probably more than with Pakistanis.

Q: When you arrived in India and set yourself up as DCM, they obviously knew that you had been the dissenting consul general in Dacca.

BLOOD: With the Indians, of course, that was very much of a plus.

Q: Yes. Did that help you?

BLOOD: Yes, it did. Oh, publicly nothing was ever said about it, but the newsmen were aware of it, and the Indian foreign office people were aware of it. I think I was looked upon as somebody who was not hostile to India.

Q: Were we generally off to a good start with India in the Carter Administration and Ambassador—

BLOOD: Oh, absolutely.

Q: Was he a popular figure there?

BLOOD: Yes, we were off to a good start because his arrival coincided almost exactly with the end of the emergency in the election of the Desai government and Mrs. Gandhi's departure and the restoration of human rights and democracy in India. So that was very much a plus. Then Desai and Jimmy Carter had a rather interesting relationship through letter writing that went a little further than most of the letters written from head of state to head of state.

So it was a good time to arrive there. But then, of course, things began to disintegrate to some extent because of the nuclear issue, for one, and then because of the dissolution of the Janata government fell apart or were voted out.

Q: Talk about the nuclear issue a little bit.

BLOOD: That was the major issue that we as the embassy had with India during the time that I was there.

Q: What prompted the Indians to go nuclear? Was it their experience with East Pakistan and the United States at that time? Our tilting policy towards Pakistan government?

BLOOD: Well, I think there are a couple reasons. One was the Chinese went nuclear in 1964. And India now thinks of themselves in the same league with China rather than in the league with Pakistan. There is often speculation that when we sent the Enterprise task force into the Bay of Bengal in 1971, that the Indians thought that if perhaps they had nuclear weapons, maybe we would have hesitated to make any such show of force. I think it's primarily because the Chinese did it. Also, I think it was a matter of prestige.

Remember, the Indians exploded a nuclear device, but they haven't gone that extra step of making nuclear weapons. They could, but they haven't.

Q: A nuclear device, nuclear weapons—

BLOOD: Well, yes. They have shown they can do it, but they have stopped short so they can get the best of both worlds. They have proven that they are technically capable, and they can still inveigh against nuclear weapons.

Q: You don't think they've stockpiled nuclear weapons?

BLOOD: No, I don't.

Q: I mean, you don't think that in your heart of hearts, or you think there is evidence of that?

BLOOD: I don't think so. I think we have been following that as closely as we can. But, of course, they could on short notice make nuclear weapons.

Q: What efforts did we make, and how would you evaluate those efforts in trying to dissuade them from going nuclear?

BLOOD: Well, that was well before I was ever in India, so I don't know.

Q: When did the bomb—

BLOOD: It was 1974. I got there in 1977.

Q: They had already done the explosion.

BLOOD: And they had stopped.

Q: So what was the issue?

BLOOD: The issue was not that. The nuclear issue was Congress had passed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 which said that after a eighteen-month grace period, the United States would be obliged to stop shipments of nuclear material to any country which did not have all of its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards or which did not—

Q: Permit its—

BLOOD: Join the Nonproliferation Treaty which would amount to the same thing. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 obliged the United States to, after eighteen-months grace period, to suspend shipments of nuclear material to any country that didn't put all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards or adhere to the Nonproliferation Treaty which

is the same thing because signatories of the Nonproliferation Treaty have to put all their facilities under safeguards.

We had an agreement with India whereby we would provide slightly enriched uranium to be used as fuel in two nuclear power reactors near Bombay, a place called Tarapur. These facilities were under IAEA safeguards. And the Indians had agreed not to reprocess into plutonium any of the fuel or to look elsewhere for a supplier. The problem was that India had other nuclear facilities which were not under safeguard. Facilities which they developed on their own without foreign help. They refused to put these under safeguard.

So under the terms of the Act, when the Indians applied for new shipments of enriched uranium, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission voted against the shipment. Under the law, the president could decide in the national interest to go ahead with the shipment anyhow, but the Congress could veto the president's action by a vote of both houses of Congress.

President Carter authorized the shipment. The House voted against the shipment, and the Senate by a very close vote, two votes I think, sustained the president. So that shipment went forward, but it was very clear to everybody as a result of these events that that would be the last shipment. And it was.

Then we went into a sort of never-never land with the Indians in which time the Soviets offered to supply them. But the end result which took place well after I left India was that the Indians agreed to get their enriched uranium from France. The facilities are still under safeguard, but the other Indian facilities are not under safeguard so we have ceased to be a supplier to India in the nuclear field and without any influence in the nuclear field any more.

Q: Should we have conducted ourselves differently on that issue? Should we have—

BLOOD: No, I think the . . . There was never any disagreement in the embassy and in the State Department that we should keep trying to negotiate with the Indians. The trouble was

that this legislation had this guillotine effect, you know. If by a certain time the Indians don't do something, boom, you've got to cut it off.

Q: Could we have prevailed if we hadn't had that humiliating deadline for the Indians?

BLOOD: Perhaps, perhaps. But the Indians feel very strongly about this. They feel the Nonproliferation Treaty is discriminatory because it distinguishes the nuclear haves from the have-nots. And also the US action went further than the actions of any other nuclear supplier like the Soviets or the French or the Germans or the British by insisting that all facilities be under safeguard. I think it was a poorly conceived bit of legislation. It has caused the same problem in a number of other countries like Argentina and Brazil where we have cut off assistance, and those countries have merely just gone to another country for assistance.

Q: Do you know, did we make an effort with the French to prevent that?

BLOOD: Oh, no. We would much prefer the French to the Soviets as a supplier.

Q: Right.

BLOOD: No, no, no.

Q: We didn't encourage the French to replace us though, did we?

BLOOD: I don't know whether we encouraged it, but we certainly welcomed it.

Q: Really?

BLOOD: Yes. Oh, no, the idea was not to cut them off from the supplier. The idea, of course, was to use that as leverage, that was the Congressional intent. It was never the embassy viewpoint, the embassy just had to live with the law. It really exacerbated our US-Indian relations.

Q: Was the law—

BLOOD: And see the Indians could claim it was ex post facto. Here we were with an agreement that was supposed to last until 1993, and we were changing the conditions upon which we provided the shipment. When we initially made this agreement, we weren't that stringent. We suddenly decided to apply very, very stringent conditions.

Q: Was the law designed, written, with India in mind?

BLOOD: No, not particularly. I think it was in part because the Indian explosion in 1974 had triggered a lot of concern that countries could use their peaceful nuclear power system to get the material for nuclear weapons. India was the first country that did that. That was the concern - that other countries would follow suit.

Q: You don't think Israel did that as well?

BLOOD: Beg your pardon?

Q: Israel?

BLOOD: No, Israel, I think, has just secretly set out to do it. They don't have a peaceful nuclear—

Q: I see.

BLOOD: Nuclear power system in Israel. I mean, power reactors and all.

Q: Your discussions with Indians over this failure to reach any kind of an agreement, did this seriously distort our bilateral relationship during your period there?

BLOOD: Oh, yes, it did.

Q: I mean, it really made life difficult for you as a . . .

BLOOD: Oh, not in personal terms, no.

Q: Right.

BLOOD: We found Indians very, very friendly and cooperative. No, not in personal terms but in official terms, yes.

Q: Were there other issues with the Indians where we had harmonious and productive relationships? I mean, how would you characterize it after that happy beginning?

BLOOD: Happy beginning. Well, it turned sour not only because of the nuclear issue but also because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which suddenly made Pakistan very important in our eyes because that was the only way you could get aid to the Afghan resistance was through Pakistan. When I went out to India, it was sort of a nice situation in that our relations with India were much better than our relations with Pakistan at the time.

Q: Probably in consequence—

BLOOD: Because again because the nuclear issue with Pakistan.

Q: Right.

BLOOD: And human rights, and the fact that they didn't have a functioning democracy there. So that was sort of the interesting—I had never been in that situation before.

But with the Soviet invasion, suddenly Pakistan became very important to us, and India became relatively unimportant. And the Indians sensed that and didn't like and were pretty unhappy about it.

Q: The Indians, of course, didn't react nearly the way we did to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

BLOOD: No, no, they didn't.

Q: What did they think of our reaction? I mean, how did they—

BLOOD: Oh, thought it was exaggerated. They thought by helping the resistance against the Soviets, we were just prolonging the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and that we should cease. If we wanted the Soviets out, we shouldn't help the resistance.

Q: How should the Soviets be driven out then?

BLOOD: They argued that they would just leave. When the resistance petered out, they would just leave the communist government in place and pull out.

Q: And they had no concern with a communist government in Afghanistan?

BLOOD: No.

Q: Did they really care what government was in Afghanistan? How important was Afghanistan to New Delhi?

BLOOD: Well, remember, Afghanistan traditionally had bad relations with Pakistan. So I think India would like to see a government there that is not on friendly terms with Pakistan which is unlikely to happen. The earlier governments had not been, the communist government was not.

Q: Pretty sure thing in other words.

BLOOD: Yes.

Q: Our AID program, it ended when you arrived in—I mean, the substantial AID program . . .

BLOOD: It began again when I was in India. We started a new program again.

Q: But on a much smaller scale.

BLOOD: Much smaller scale. About a 100 million a year. Very small staff.

Q: Not at all lording it over the embassy.

BLOOD: No, no. Nice relationship. AID was in its place.

Q: How were your relationships with the Soviets in New Delhi? There they were presumably somewhat like they were in Afghanistan, that is—

BLOOD: Oh, no, no where near as close as in Afghanistan.

Q: But, I mean, they were superior position to you in the eyes of the Indians, no? I mean, the Indians preferred the Soviets because of their aid program much as the Afghans had in your earlier stay in that country.

BLOOD: Well, in India there is sort of a dual track operating. Indians appreciate Soviet military sales and aid and consistent diplomatic support that the Soviet Union has given to India. At the same time, they really prefer Westerners to Soviets. They are democrats themselves. They like our ways of life, our institutions much more than the Soviets. The aim of most Indians is to visit the United States or live in the United States, many of them. They are quite capable of making the distinction on sort of the geopolitical level and on the personal level.

Q: Well, did you have any kind of relationship with the Soviets in India?

BLOOD: No, no more than the usual you would have in most posts where you bumped into them very occasionally. They were represented there by Yuli Vorontsov, who had been in Washington, who was the first deputy Soviet foreign minister and is now concurrently serving as Soviet ambassador to Afghanistan. Very able fellow.

Q: What about Indian politics at this stage? How well do you think our embassy understood the Indian scene? Was it a country where you could get behind what's in the press and really get an appreciation for the dynamics of politics?

BLOOD: I think we could pretty well. I think generally we tended to underestimate the extent of the swings in the pendulum. For instance, to underestimate the Janata victory in '77 and Mrs. Gandhi's return victory in the end of 1979. We could call it right as to the winner, but we tended to be more—

Q: Cautious.

BLOOD: Maybe cautious, you know, and say instead of a seventy-thirty victory, we would say maybe a fifty-five-forty-five or sixty-forty or something like that.

Q: When Mrs. Gandhi came back was Ambassador Goheen stay the full four years?

BLOOD: Yes. No. Ambassador Goheen resigned shortly after President Reagan was elected in November 1980. He actually left the first of January in 1981.

Q: Right. So you had a new ambassador?

BLOOD: No, we didn't. I served as charg# until I left.

Q: Uh huh. So you dealt with Madame Gandhi then?

BLOOD: Yes.

Q: Tell us something about what was your impression of her.

BLOOD: Well, she is very hard to figure because she could be—

Q: Did you talk to her as charg# in the first place?

BLOOD: Well, I never—the times that I visited her, I think, were always in accompanying—

Q: Someone else?

BLOOD: Visitors, yes, like congressmen, Jeane Kirkpatrick, somebody like that. I don't think Washington ever asked me to seek an appointment with her on my own, so I didn't. I wasn't rebuffed by her, but it just was not requested.

Q: What was your impression of her? How did you . . .

BLOOD: Remarkable woman. I mean, she—a woman of moods. I think the moods though could be politically guided. I've seen her very charming when say somebody like Chuck Percy, Senator from Illinois, came. Very friendly, chatting family and all that. Very warm in her own home. I've seen her when she received Jeane Kirkpatrick, and Jeane Kirkpatrick was doing her best to be nice and gracious, and Mrs. Gandhi was cold as an iceberg from the very beginning. I mean, she just decided she didn't want to have anything to do with Jeane Kirkpatrick and made it probably cruelly obviously apparent.

Q: But an able woman, intelligent?

BLOOD: Oh, extremely intelligent, yes. Tough, tough.

Q: Attitude toward the United States?

BLOOD: Very frank like most Indians. She tells what she thought. I like that. I mean, if she thought we were doing the wrong thing, the wrong idea, she would waste no time in telling that.

Q: Now you were sent off in the middle of—at the end of your tour—about two-thirds through to Afghanistan.

BLOOD: Yes.

Q: Spike Dubs had been shot in February.

BLOOD: Yes, Valentine's Day, February 14. The same day that the embassy was . . .

Q: I was in the Department at that time. Yes, I know.

BLOOD: Yes.

Q: But you came later? You didn't go immediately?

BLOOD: No. Bruce Amstutz was the DCM to Spike, and he became charg# after Spike's murder. But by October—in the meantime—yes, by October he wanted a break. He wanted to join his wife in Europe and have a little respite from Afghanistan. Washington asked me to go up from New Delhi and take over the embassy for, as it turned out, about six weeks. And so I did.

Under supplementary instruction there we didn't maintain embassy, but we dealt with consular administrative matters not political. The foreign minister then, Shah Mohammed Dose, I had known when he was a junior political officer when I was there the first time so I did call on him and did find out a couple things about . . . For instance, there was a fellow that had been director general of their ministry of foreign affairs, Raul Rolanfahadi. It was rumored that he had been killed in Afghanistan, and Dose could tell me in all honesty

that he was not dead. I was happy to report that. Subsequently, he did escape from Afghanistan and got back to France.

Then Washington asked me to seek an appointment with Hafizullah Amin who was the president and the leader. He was also head of the party. And I did. I think I was the last Westerner to see Amin alive because he was killed by the Soviets when they invaded Christmas of '79.

Q: What did Washington want to tell him?

BLOOD: Well, about the only thing they wanted to tell him was that he couldn't expect any resumption of aid until he could satisfy us about their role in Spike's death.

Q: Uh huh.

BLOOD: Because, you know, remember the circumstances were—

Q: Right.

BLOOD: Were such that it was just an equivocal role that the Afghans and the Soviets played, too, in that. Then to just sort of listen to him. And I did make that point. We had really terminated our AID mission. There were just a couple residual people left over there. Of course, it was impossible. You couldn't have conducted an AID effort anyhow because there was a civil war going on, and you couldn't—I mean, it was an academic issue really. But at least we could make that point - that we weren't satisfied with their attitude.

Q: Did you have anything that you observed in your six weeks in Afghanistan that gave you the feeling the Soviets might be contemplating a move into the country?

BLOOD: Not really. The Soviets were moving in incrementally all that time. In fact, we were having sort of a running discussion with Washington about how many were in the country. We were trying to keep track. We could see convoys with Soviet equipment and

Soviet troops coming down, and we tried to keep tabs on as much as we can. As I recall, we were debating whether there were 8,000 or 12,000 in the country.

Q: Were they engaging in combat at that time?

BLOOD: No, just as advisors. A lot of military advisors for the Afghan troops.

I was surprised by the actual invasion for two reasons. One, I didn't think the government of Afghanistan was in that much danger of being toppled. I mean, they weren't very close to a military defeat. Also, it seemed to me that the Soviets could accomplish their purpose just by continuing what they were doing which was infiltrating, you know, a 1,000 a week or something like that until they had more and more and more troops in there rather than coming in suddenly. The only reason I can see for it was they had to get rid of Amin, and they . . .

Q: Well, if they also felt they were going to need a 100,000 troops, they couldn't do that incrementally.

BLOOD: Yes. Well, they could have done—

Q: Pretty soon someone would say, "Look what they've done here."

BLOOD: Yes.

Q: What did you do, though, that made the Soviets not want you as charg# on a permanent basis? What do you suppose you did? Or what do they think you did?

BLOOD: They didn't give any specific reason. My own favorite reason is that in New Delhi we had been operating a program whereby we each week brought in American and other western journalists—the political section did this—and briefed them on what was going on in Afghanistan based on reports from our embassy. In those days, no foreign correspondents were getting into Afghanistan. And our idea was, of course, to keep

Afghanistan alive as a story. Of course, we played up any successes of the resistance and any troubles that the government had.

Q: These were based on reports from your embassy in Kabul?

BLOOD: Yes. The Indians didn't like this. And, of course, we had—

Q: George Griffin.

BLOOD: George Griffin was up there then. He came down because his wife was here, and we would chat with him. We were getting quite a bit of information. And the Indians didn't like this particularly. Of course, I'm sure the Afghans didn't like it. Most of the stories that appeared in the American press or the European press at the time were coming out of these briefings. That's my feeling.

Now the Indian ambassador in Kabul, a fellow named Monty Diction, was Indian high commissioner in Sri Lanka in 1986 when I stopped there. We talked about this. He said that he had gone to the Afghans and asked why that they turned me down because we had known each other. He had been the press spokesman for the foreign ministry. They said because he had had secret meetings with Amin. And I told him that was not true. I had had the one meeting that I mentioned with you with Amin and no others.

But I think another reason may have been that some Afghans, hostile to the regime, knowing that I had served in Afghanistan, when they came through Delhi, would call on me and chat with me.

Anyhow, they said anybody but him. The Department decided not to send anybody, instead to have Charlie Dunbar, who was the number two—he would have been my number two—that he would become charg# which worked out very well for Charlie.

Q: You weren't going to be ambassador.

BLOOD: No, I was going to be charg#. No ambassador. No, we weren't going to send an ambassador.

Q: Okay.

BLOOD: But Charlie would have stayed on, and he would have been the number two. But then they decided they wouldn't put anybody else in. It worked out well for Charlie. A good man.

Q: Yes.

BLOOD: Very good man.

Q: Now where were we? So then you left New Delhi in October of '81.

BLOOD: Yes.

Q: We skipped ahead.

BLOOD: Oh, what's his name? Harry Barnes was by the spring of '81 nominated to be ambassador to India but couldn't get out there for a while. He picked the DCM, Marion Quickmore. Marion came out a month before I was to leave so we would have an overlap. I still acted as charg#. And I guess he acted as DCM in a way. Then I left, I think October 1 of '81. Marion was charg# until Harry got there a couple weeks later.

Q: Anything happen during your period of charg#ship . . .

BLOOD: Well, it was a period of deteriorating relations with India because of our arms sales to Pakistan. The Indians were protesting this loud.

Q: But the—

BLOOD: My own personal relations with the Indians in the foreign office still remained very good. I think . . .

Q: It was really a Reagan Administration policy that they were objecting to then, wasn't it?

BLOOD: Yes. But it was a quid pro quo. It was all I had to do with Afghanistan. Sometimes we would tell them that quite frankly, you know, you are out of line on Afghanistan not the rest of us. I mean, most of the Third World is in the same wicket we are.

It was still a very, very pleasant post, even though you do put up with these, you know, official announcements of unhappiness with the United States. But it didn't reflect in the personal relationships with the Indians at all.

Q: So you left, and then you came back to Washington.

BLOOD: Came back to Washington, didn't know what was in store. Found out that there wasn't much in store. Then NEA asked if I wanted to go out to Kabul as charg#. Of course, it would have meant that I couldn't take my wife but was, you know, hardship pay and danger pay and besides it was a very interesting situation even though it is difficult to report on a country when you are virtually locked in an embassy. I said I was willing to do it. I started studying Dari at the FSI and going through briefings and getting myself prepared.

Then they refused the visa and then I decided pretty shortly after that—I sort of checked around again and there didn't seem to be anything interesting. I wasn't really keen on staying in Washington unless there was a good job.

Q: Why Archer do you suppose—

BLOOD: There was a shift in NEA. The deputy secretary for SOA became available, but Howie Schaffer got that. That would have been a possibility, but that was ruled out.

Q: Right. Nick Veliotes would have been—well, he was there.

BLOOD: Nick was still assistant secretary. There was deputy secretaryship in the office that handles nuclear matters that I thought I could . . . I had a lot of experience in that. They still hadn't filled that position when I retired. It was sort of a disorganized outfit there.

Q: But why do you suppose that you didn't get your earthly reward of the Carter Administration?

BLOOD: Well, I found out that I came very close to it.

Sri Lanka became open. And I remember Jay Coon came by from Washington and told me that I was the bureau's candidate for Sri Lanka. But he said, “Don't get your hopes up, because it's going to a political.”

So I said, “Okay, thanks for telling me. I appreciate the vote of confidence.” Then I found out, it didn't go to a political. What happened was that Dave Newsom, who was Under Secretary for Political Affairs, intervened and pushed for his former DCM in Indonesia. He had been the ambassador in Indonesia right before that. Oh, what's his name? He has since died.

Q: Don Touissant.

BLOOD: Don Touissant, who had never been in South Asia at all in his life, but an able fellow. So I didn't get it. But I think if that hadn't happened, I think NEA would have . . . And it hadn't gone to White House candidate that I was the bureau's candidate for it.

Q: But then when you decided to retire, did you retire without any feeling of bitterness against the Service for not having—I mean, they gave you an award.

BLOOD: Yes. Oh, some unhappiness, yes.

Q: I mean, but they never really stood by you in terms of your—

BLOOD: Oh, I didn't expect that. I think the—

Q: Why? Why didn't you expect it? You don't think the Foreign Service stands by its own kind?

BLOOD: Well, if you antagonize somebody like Kissinger, and Kissinger becomes Secretary of State or is influential in the halls of an administration, I can see why the Department is not going to antagonize him by not giving me some job, yes.

Q: Even when under a Democratic administration you don't think they would?

BLOOD: Well, as I say, yes, there was no problem there. I think the Sri Lanka thing was close. I mean, that's just maneuverings within the Department. I think the bureau was pushing for me.

Q: So.

BLOOD: So from that point of view, I think that was my only opportunity once was during the Carter Administration.

Q: Well, as DCM in New Delhi you probably had as good a job—

BLOOD: Oh, I think so, too.

Q: You could have had in the subcontinent.

BLOOD: And I was charg# there for, oh I guess all told, it must have been two years. The ambassador was away quite a bit of the time. He had two heart attacks while I was there and triple surgery, and so he was away and I was left.

Q: Now, you know, your career spanned forty years almost, thirty-five.

BLOOD: Thirty-five.

Q: Thirty-five years. What kind of change did you see in the Foreign Service? I mean, do you have the same high regard for the Foreign Service when you left at the end? The caliber of its personnel, its high principles and so forth?

BLOOD: Not completely. I had seen people who I don't respect get to the top of the Foreign Service, career officers. Tactics that I wouldn't admire. I don't like that. I think there has been an exaggerated emphasis on the Foreign Service and its management aspects more than negotiating and understanding and interpreting foreign cultures and viewpoints. I think that has gone overboard.

I think the whole aspect of the spousal relationship has changed into so many officers who are serving and their wives don't accompany them to post. They serve there. The married couples has drastically changed. Couples being able to serve together at a post has changed the Foreign Service a great deal and not to the better.

It seems to be they continue to get very, very able people. I was struck when I went around the world a semester at sea because all the ports where we had hosts, there were briefings arranged usually by junior officers. I would usually introduce them to the students, and then have a chance before and after to chat with them. And I was struck by the very low morale.

Q: Low morale?

BLOOD: Very low morale.

Q: This was in 1986?

BLOOD: '86, yes. Junior officers. Mostly because of the politization of the upper ranks of the Foreign Service. I read the latest newsletter. Seventeen new ambassadors, I didn't see one career ambassador there. All of them. I don't know whether we brought it down upon ourselves or not. There certainly is an idea among politicals that people from outside the career can do the job as well as we can. Of course, in many cases, they can.

Q: Yes, some of them.

BLOOD: There is no doubt about it. Some are very, very good.

Q: Let me ask you a little about Congress' role. That has also changed a great deal in thirty-five years.

BLOOD: Oh, yes.

Q: Being towards the end, they sort of complicated your life in India in a very important sense. In the beginning, it probably had very little impact.

BLOOD: Little impact, yes.

Q: Except for the law passing put you into the visa business for years. Would you comment on that?

BLOOD: In a way, that's one of the more exciting and rewarding aspects, I think, has been dealing with Congress, mostly in the occasion of visits. I always found them interesting. I think it is because of the experience in Bangladesh, but I welcome a fairly strong congressional oversight over foreign policy to keep the executive branch honest.

I think what I object to is this spate of recent legislation which imposed sort of automatic penalties through the cutting of aid and assistance to countries who take actions of which we do not approve which doesn't give the executive branch much leeway and leverage

and flexibility. I think that, in the whole, those are not helpful at all. This is a trend that has been, I think, damaging to our foreign relations.

But we have a real need for our congressional oversight to . . . I've seen our government lie enough that somebody has got to, besides the press, has to be on the—

Q: Well, what about the press? How do they stack up in your—

BLOOD: Oh, great. Great, I think. I worked very closely with them particularly in India.

It is a, you know, two-way street. We can be helpful to them because we give them our honest evaluation of the situation, say, within a country. They can be helpful because they often have much greater access than we do because somebody who is writing in the New York Times can see, say, Mrs. Gandhi much more readily than I could. They would often see us before they saw Mrs. Gandhi. We could plant questions through them. They would debrief us after their meeting, and tell us things that they weren't using in the story because they thought it might be interesting to us. It is sort of a symbiotic relationship that was very productive.

You get to know these people. They are mainly in the same business we are in, I think, except they are not working for the US Government.

Q: Do you think they are, as a rule, competent?

BLOOD: Oh, yes.

Q: Do they have integrity?

BLOOD: Yes, yes. Well, I mentioned the one exception in East Pakistan. I think that's the only one I know of where somebody violated a confidence. I think the same was true of the Indian press. They are very, very able, and we worked very closely with them. You get to trust each other. It can be dangerous—

Q: Right.

BLOOD: If you make a mistake.

Q: Or if you try to manipulate them, and you fail.

BLOOD: Yes.

Q: They can strike back at you.

BLOOD: Oh, yes, you shouldn't do that. I think you can let them know that you can't answer a question. I mean, you don't tell them lies, but you just tell them, “I'm sorry, I can't tell you that.”

Q: Speaking of telling lies—maybe that's not the right connective to use—but what about your assessment of Dr. Kissinger? How does he stack up as the leader of the US foreign affairs during his tenure in your view? Tell me your perspective. In East Pakistan.

BLOOD: Oh. Well, let's take Cyprus as an even better example. I think where he showed up the worst has been issues like East Pakistan and Cyprus which were peripheral interests from his point of view. Areas in which he had not been concerned at all beforehand, suddenly a crisis brew, and he involved himself.

In the case of Cyprus—I know because I intended to try and follow the best which I could even though I was no longer connected with Cyprus—he disregarded the views of the professionals in the State Department. He always saw everything as a geopolitical contest with the Soviet Union. Whereas more likely than not, it was a regional interest without any really great geopolitical concerns.

In the case of Cyprus, when Makarios was overthrown by a coup engineered by the Greek junta, and they put in a murdered and a thug in his place, we should have denounced that. As everybody in the State Department felt we should. This is a thing we don't tolerate.

He didn't denounce it. He was playing for time, hoping to work something out. He didn't like Makarios. And by so doing, it ended up as a disaster for us. The Turks moved in. Our relations with Turkey suffered. Our relations with Greece suffered. The junta fell, that was the only good thing that came out of it. That wasn't what Kissinger wanted.

And if we had done the right, moral thing directly in the beginning, it might have changed the situation. But the Machiavellian approach, the manipulative approach, I think can often backfire.

Q: I think that's a good point on which to end this interview.

BLOOD: Okay.

Q: And as we have run out of tape.

BLOOD: The lady in red. [Laughter]

Q: [Laughter] There is a lady waiting here to take you away. Thank you very much, Archer.

BLOOD: Would you like a beer or something?

End of interview